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ARTICLES
THE PRESIDENT'S STATUTORY POWERS TO
ADMINISTER THE LAWS
Kevin M. Stack*
When does a statute grant powers to the President as opposed to other
officials ? Prominent theories of presidentialpower argue or assume that any
statute granting authority to an executive officer also implicitly confers that
authority upon the President. This Article challenges that statutory construction. It argues that the President has statutory authority to direct the administration of the laws only under statutes that grant to the President in name.
Congress'senduringpractice of grantingpower to executive officers subject to
express conditions of presidentialcontrol supports a strong negative inference
that the President has no directive authority when a statute grants authority
to an executive officer without any mention of presidential control. Such a
construction also has significant institutionaladvantages: Not only is Congress generally ill equipped to police the validity of the President's assertions
of statutory authority, but the President has strong incentives to claim that
his actions are authorized by existing statutes. Limiting the occasionsfor the
President to claim statutory power to those statutes in which Congress has
expressly granted him authority helps to restrict the President's adventurous
assertions of statutory power and provides a check on the President internal
to the executive branch, while still recognizing Congress's important interests
in placing certain matters in the President's own hands.
This statutory conclusionfurther implies-contrary to the suggestion of
Dean Elena Kagan-thatpresidentialdirection of administrativeagency action may not qualify for judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. unless the statute expressly
grants authority to the President. It also provides an account of the legal
status of executive orders and other presidentialdirectives that lack independent constitutionalauthorization: Those directives may legally bind the discretion of executive officials and the public only if the President acts under a
statute grantingpower to the President in name.
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
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INTRODUCTION

Presidents do not live by constitutional authority alone. Many of the
most important presidential initiatives involve claims of statutory authorization.' In our constitutional system, the significance of the President's
assertions of statutory powers should come as no surprise. The Constitution grants the President relatively few independent powers, at least in
comparison to Congress. 2 Yet presidents are held politically accountable
for how the federal government as a whole functions, and in particular3
for how administrative agencies exercise their vast delegated powers.
That combination-a dearth of independent constitutional powers and
political pressure to utilize the bureaucracy effectively-provides strong
incentives for presidents to claim that already-existing statutes authorize
them to implement policy. Moreover, locating an existing statutory
power as a basis for action saves the President the potentially costly and
slow process of assembling a majority in Congress to enact legislation.
Thus to understand the scope of the President's powers we must understand the President's statutory powers. That, in turn, requires interpreting statutes.
With any grant of statutory authority, two different questions arise:
First, what powers are given, and second, to whom? On this second question, a persisting strain of thought endorses the view that statutes grant1. See, e.g., Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918, 918 (2001), reprinted in 10
U.S.C. § 801 note (Supp. I 2001) (establishing military tribunals, claiming authority "as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Joint Resolution and sections 821 and 836 of title 10, United States Code" (citation
omitted)); Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139, 139 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701
note (2000) (suspending legal claims against Iran under authority of "the Constitution and
statutes of the United States, including [specified sections of several Acts]");
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199, 199 (1970), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 note (2000) (establishing Environmental Protection Agency "pursuant to the
provisions of chapter 9 of tide 5 of the United States Code"); Exec. Order No. 10,924, 26
Fed. Reg. 1789, 1789 (Mar. 1, 1961) (establishing Peace Corps, claiming authority under
Mutual Security Act of 1954); Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602, 602 (1971-1975)
(repealed 1982) (establishing wage and price freeze, claiming authority under "the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, including the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970").
2. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and
Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 549 (2004) ("[T]he specific grants of power [to the
President] in Article II are few and limited, especially when compared with Congress's
extensive list of powers in Article I . . . ."); H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority
over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527, 540 &
n.65 (1999) [hereinafter Powell, President's Authority] ("Other than issuing pardons and
making state of the union addresses, the President can do very little domestically without
congressional authorization."); see also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the
American Political Departments, 1 Hastings Const. L.Q. 13, 14-17 (1974) (providing
compact taxonomy of President's constitutional powers).
3. E.g., David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design 4, 25-27 (2003)
(noting that presidents are held accountable for "the success or failure of the entire
government" and for their performance as managers of federal bureaucracy).
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ing powers to executive officials should be read to include the President
as an implied recipient of those powers. Attorney General Caleb Cushing's opinion arguing that no Head of Department granted authority by
statute "can lawfully perform an official act against the will of the President"4 is an early and prominent touchstone for this view. This reading
of the President's statutory powers found supporters among subsequent
attorneys general in the nineteenth century.5 Its basic premises were embraced by the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States,6 and it was expressly and forcefully endorsed in Department of Justice legal opinions
7
during the 1980s.
This broad construction of the scope of the President's statutory
powers has prominent contemporary defenders. Dean Elena Kagan of
the Harvard Law School argues that delegations to executive agency officials should be read as granting the President authority to direct agency
4. Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 453,
469-70 (1855).
5. See, e.g., Approval of Court-Martial Sentence, 15 Op. Att'y Gen. 290, 296 (1877)
("[T]he direction of the President is to be presumed in all orders or instructions issuing
from the proper Department, which, to be operative, require such direction." (citation
omitted)); Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 527,
527 (1863) ("[T]he true theory of departmental administration is, that heads of the
Executive Departments shall discharge their administrative duties in such manner as the
President may direct; they being, as one of my predecessors terms them 'executors of the
will of the President.'" (quoting 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 453, 463 (1855))).
6. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Myers addressed the scope of the President's removal powers
over executive officers. See id. at 106. Chief Justice Taft's opinion endorses the position
that the President has directive powers over the ordinary duties of executive officers, with
the exception of only those duties "so peculiarly and specifically committed to the
discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the President may overrule
or revise the officer's interpretation . . .in a particular instance." Id. at 134-35. This
Article, as noted below, argues that such duties are not merely exceptions, but the norm
when Congress grants authority to executive officials. See infra Part II. ChiefJustice Taft's
1916 lectures on presidential power provide some indication of the types of delegations to
officials that he viewed as beyond the scope of presidential revision. In these lectures,
Chief Justice Taft suggests that the President may remove the Comptroller of the Treasury
and, with the consent of the Senate, seek appointment of another; "but under the act of
Congress creating the office, the President cannot control or revise the decisions of this
officer." William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers 79-81, 125-26 (H.
Jefferson Powell ed., photo. reprint 2002) (1924).
7. See, e.g., Statute Limiting the President's Authority to Supervise the Director of the
Centers for Disease Control in the Distribution of an AIDS Pamphlet, 12 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 47, 48 (1988) (arguing that Constitution vests executive power in President alone,
President is "solely responsible for supervising and directing the activities of his
subordinates in carrying out executive functions," and "[a]ny attempt by Congress to
constrain the President's authority to supervise and direct his subordinates in this respect,
violates the Constitution"); Constitutionality of Statute Requiring Executive Agency to
Report Directly to Congress, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 632, 633 (1982) (defending view
that President's constitutional authority includes "the right to supervise and review the
work of such subordinate officials, including reports issued either to the public or to
Congress").
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action under those statutes. 8 Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash
contend that statutes delegating power to an executive official, such as
the Secretary of Labor, should be construed to permit the President to
exercise the delegated powers directly-for instance, by personally
promulgating workplace safety standards. 9 Further, scholars and officials
implicitly endorse the same generous statutory constructions when they
argue that the President's executive orders legally bind executive branch
agencies.
The claim of implied statutory authorization has critical implications
for constitutional theories of executive power as well as for administrative
law. On the one hand, defenders of a strongly "unitary" executive argue
that the Constitution requires that all executive power be vested in the
President, and therefore that any agency action should be subject to presidential revision.' 0 But that constitutional commitment does not eliminate the need for statutory interpretation. Even proponents of a strongly
unitary executive must ask whether statutes delegating power to an
agency can be fairly read to grant authority to the President. The answer
to that question determines the practical outcome of their view. Specifically, it determines whether they may rely-as they implicitly have-on
the principles of constitutional avoidance to accommodate their constitutional commitments through saving constructions of statutes," or
whether their constitutional commitments lead to the conclusion that
8. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2326-31 (2001).
9. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 Yale LJ. 541, 596 & n.210 (1994); see also Saikrishna B. Prakash, Hail to the
Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President's Administrative Powers, 102 Yale L.J.
991, 991-94 (1993) (defending view that President retains constitutional authority to
substitute his judgment forjudgment of executive official delegated authority by Congress,
even when Congress prohibits presidential intervention).
10. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 594-96 (defending constitutional
requirement of presidential power to act in place of agency officials and to nullify their
actions); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1166 (1992) (identifying, as
mechanisms of presidential control over executive officers, power to supplant decisions of
subordinate, to nullify subordinate's decisions even when statute purports to grant
subordinate executive discretion, and to remove subordinate).
11. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance includes at least two distinct principles
that could be invoked by strong unitarians. The "classical" principle of avoidance states
that "as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, [the Court's] plain duty is to adopt that which will
save the Act." Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring); see
also Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945, 1948-49 (1997) (defining
classical avoidance). The "modern" principle of avoidance is triggered when a statute may
be construed to avoid a construction that raises serious constitutional questions (even
without determining that the construction would be unconstitutional). See, e.g., EdwardJ.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988) (stating that where there is more than one acceptable construction of statute courts
should construe it to avoid raising serious constitutional problems); Vermeule, supra, at
1949 (describing modern principle of avoidance).
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statutes delegating power to officials other than the President are
unconstitutional.
On the other hand, the view that delegations to executive officials
should be read to grant power to the President goes to fundamental questions of administrative law. At a basic level, these broad statutory constructions imply that delegations to executive officials-one of the basic
building blocks of the administrative state-vest officials with a duty to
the President that overrides their independent legal discretion. In other
words, so read, these delegations do not empower an officer to make his
or her own determinations in which the President's directions weigh as a
significant factor; rather, they create a duty of compliance with the President's will. In addition, these broad readings of the President's statutory
powers bear on the scope of judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 12 Chevron requires that courts accept reasonable agency constructions of statutes the agency administers
as long as the statute does not clearly address the matter.' 3 If delegations
of power to officials are read as delegations to the President, then it is
only a half-step further to conclude, as Kagan does, that judicial deference under Chevron to executive agencies should be a function of
4
whether the agency action follows from the President's involvement.'
This Article challenges the recurring claim that statutes conferring
power on executive officials should be read to include the President as an
implied recipient of authority. The initial thrust of the argument is to
show that as a matter of statutory construction the President has directive
authority-that is, the power to act directly under the statute or to bind
the discretion of lower level officials-only when the statute expressly
grants power to the President in name. It then traces the implications of
this emphasis on express delegation for the treatment of the President by
the courts, executive branch officials, and Congress, and defends the following claims: First, the President's constructions of delegated authority
should be eligible for Chevron deference, but only when they follow from
statutes that expressly grant power to the President; second, absent an
independent source of constitutional authority, executive orders and
other presidential directives legally bind lower level officials only when
they are based on express delegations to the President; third, in view of
the structural advantages the President as a unilateral actor has over Congress, these narrow constructions of the President's statutory powers provide an important constraint, internal to the executive branch, on presidential authority.
Part I frames the question of whether a statute grants the President
directive authority within the debate concerning the scope of the President's constitutionally granted powers and describes Kagan's argument
12. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13. Id. at 842-44; see also infra Part III.B.
14. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2376-79.
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that implying directive authority from statutory delegations to executive
officials best reflects Congress's intentions.
Part II defends the core statutory interpretation conclusion that only
grants of authority to the President by name confer directive authority to
the President. It makes this statutory argument on the grounds of a longstanding and active congressional practice of granting authority to officials expressly subject to the control of the President. From the time of
the Founding through today, Congress has expressly conditioned grants
' 5
of authority to executive officials "with the approval of the President,'
16
"with the approbation of the President," "under the direction of the
President,"1 7 or words to similar effect. These statutes, which I call
"mixed agency-President delegations," have been largely overlooked by
contemporary proponents of broad readings of the President's directive
authority. Once in view, they provide strong support for the conclusion
that statutory grants of authority to agency officials alone, absent such
conditions, do not authorize the President to act or to bind the discretion
of lower-level officials. Rather, the statutory grants of authority to an official (alone) should be read as vesting the official with an independent
duty and discretion, not a legal duty to the President. Part II also responds to the familiar objection that the fact that the President has removal power over executive officials implies that the President has, either
as a matter of principle or in practice, directive authority over these
officials.
Parts III, IV, and V pursue the implications of rejecting the broad
readings of the President's statutory powers for the courts, executive actors, and Congress, respectively. Part III examines judicial review. Based
on broad constructions of the President's directive powers, Kagan and
others argue that deference under Chevron should apply only when the
agency's action is the product of presidential direction. 18 But rejecting
that broad construction also prohibits making Chevron deference a function of presidential direction. Rather, even in the context of presidential
involvement, Chevron deference should track Congress's express choice
of delegate, not the President's influence. Thus the President's statutory
constructions are eligible for Chevron deference only with regard to statutes that expressly grant authority to the President; the President "administers" only those statutes. Part III also argues that proponents of a
unitary conception of the executive should accept this view because the
15. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000); 16 U.S.C § 459r (2000); 40 U.S.C.A. § 17302(a)
(West 2005).
16. E.g., Act of July 21, 1848, ch. 108, § 3, 9 Stat. 249, 250.
17. E.g., Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 55, § 10, 4 Stat. 270, 274. Congress also has a
practice of delegating authority directly to the President but specifying the agency or
official through whom the President must act. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 197 (2000)
(empowering President, through Secretary of Transportation, to purchase or charter
merchant vessels under specified circumstances); 50 U.S.C. app. § 468(h) (empowering
President, through Secretary of Defense, to control steel production for national defense).
18. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2376.
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framework ofjudicial review of the President's claims of statutory authority is within Congress's control.
Part IV shows how the denial of the President's implied directive authority under statutory delegations clarifies the allocation of power to interpret statutes within the contemporary executive branch and the legal
status of executive orders. Presidents frequently direct agency officials to
exercise their delegated powers in particular ways. But absent an independent constitutional power, the statutory limits on the President's directive authority suggest that executive orders may legally bind agency
officials or third parties only when the President has been granted authority in name. In this respect, the Article aims to define the scope of
the conventional assumption that executive orders and other presidential
directives bind executive officials. Moreover, restricting their binding authority to express statutory delegations exposes the intriguing and important question of agency statutory interpretation: How should agency officials treat presidential directives that do not legally bind their discretion?
Part V addresses how these statutory conclusions in turn influence
Congress's choice of delegate and defends the appeal of these constructions. Whenever Congress grants authority, it faces a choice: Should it
grant authority to the agency alone, to the President, to the agency subject to the President's control, or to some other institutional arrangement? That question of institutional design requires an understanding of
the legal implications of Congress's choice of delegate.
The narrower statutory constructions this Article defends bolster
both democratic and rule-of-law values. These constructions emphasize
that the scope of the President's statutory authority (as well as ofjudicial
deference) is in Congress's control by way of its choice of delegate. 19 The
implication that a delegation to an executive branch official creates a
duty under the law, not to the President, enforces a check, internal to the
executive branch, on the President's power. Structural advantages of the
President over Congress-such as the capacity to act unilaterally and
poor congressional incentives to monitor expansions of presidential
power-provide grounds to embrace such constraints on executive
power.

19. This emphasis on Congress's power to establish the boundaries of the President's
statutory authority may bolster the argument against courts implying incidental powers
from the President's constitutional status. It is at least consistent with the view that
Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to determine the authority of
the executive and the judiciary beyond the enumerated powers of Articles II and III (and
others clearly incident to those provisions) defeats the implication of presidential powers.
See William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of
the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the
Sweeping Clause, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1976, at 102, 107, 118.
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THE STATUTORY QUESTION

The threshold inquiry is a question of statutory interpretation:
When does a statute grant the President directive authority-that is, the
authority to act directly under the statute or to bind legally lower-level
officials? From the time of the Founding, Congress has granted authority
directly to the President.2 0 In those cases, the President, as the named
statutory delegate, obviously has authority to act under the statute. Thus
the central statutory interpretation question is whether delegations to
other officials should be read as granting the President directive authority. Should a delegation to the Secretary of Labor be read as authorizing
the President to direct the Secretary's exercise of discretion?
A. A Nineteenth-Century Controversy Alive and Well
The question of whether the President possesses directive authority
when a statute grants power to an executive officer was a recurring point
of disagreement during the nineteenth century among attorneys general,
but has never been squarely addressed by the Supreme Court. A brief
overview of these early interpretations helps to frame the basis for the
21
contemporary debate.
Throughout the nineteenth century, presidents repeatedly sought
the advice of their Attorneys General regarding the scope of presidential
powers and their duties to intervene and direct specific outcomes in the
absence of a grant of authority to the President in name. In these opinions, the attorneys general proceed from opposed assumptions about
what powers the Constitution grants the President to execute the law and
how statutory delegations should be construed. The sparring opinions of
attorneys general William Wirt and Caleb Cushing illustrate two contrasting visions of the President's statutory powers.
1. Attorney General Wirt's View. - In an early and influential opinion,
Attorney General William Wirt argues that when a statute grants authority
to a particular officer, it is that officer who has discretion under it, and
the President lacks the power to substitute his judgment for that of the
statutory delegate:
If the laws, then, require a particular officer by name to perform a duty, not only is that officer bound to perform it, but no
other officer can perform it without a violation of the law; and
20. John Preston Comer, Legislative Functions of National Administrative Authorities
52-64 (1927) (documenting early delegations).
21. For helpful treatments of these early debates, see Edward S. Corwin, The
President: Office and Powers 1787-1984, at 94-100 (5th rev. ed. 1984); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Constitution and the Attorneys General 33-34, 95-96, 148 (1999) [hereinafter
Powell, Constitution]; Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power:
Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 Mich. L.
Rev. 193, 204-07 (1981); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 605-08 (1984)
[hereinafter Strauss, Place of Agencies].
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were the President to perform it, he would not only be not takfaithfully executed, but he would be
ing care that the laws were
22
violating them himself.
Wirt argues that the Constitution's Take Care Clause 23 obliges the
President with a supervisory duty, but does not grant the power to act
directly under a grant of authority to an executive official. 24 Thus, when
a statute grants authority to an officer, Wirt writes that the Take Care
Clause does not authorize the President "to perform the duty, but to see
that the officer assigned by law performs his duty faithfully. '25 For Wirt,
that limitation on the President's powers occurs even when the exercise
of the duty involves some discretion, such as the appointment of a local
postmaster.2 6 Based on this constitutional premise, Wirt treats the question as one of statutory interpretation-when has Congress granted the
President authority to intervene? On that question, Wirt reasoned that a
statutory grant of authority to an officer alone did not itself provide the
President with directive powers due largely to Congress's practice of
granting authority that expressly mentions the President. 27 For Wirt, a
statutory delegation to an executive official vests independent discretion
and duties in that official.
2. Attorney General Cushing's View. - Attorney General Caleb Cushing defends a sharply opposed view of the President's power over statutory delegations to executive officials. Cushing posits that the Constitution places all executive officers under the direction of the President,
even where the statute places authority with the officer. 2 8 With regard to
legislation in which "an executive act is, by law, required to be performed
by a given Head of Department," Cushing writes that "the Head of the
Department is subject to the direction of the President."2 9 That direction
implies that the President can control how the executive official performs
his or her duties: "[N]o Head of Department can lawfully perform an
official act against the will of the President; and that will is by the Constitution to govern the performance of all such acts." 30 For Cushing, the Constitution's vesting of executive power in the President and its Take Care
Clause requires that statutory authorization be "implied" where Congress
has not "expressly recognize[d] the direction of the President."3 1 Were it
otherwise, Cushing goes on to argue, Congress "might by statute so divide
and transfer the executive power as utterly to subvert the Government,
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
(1855).
29.
30.
31.

The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 625 (1823).
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
1 Op. Att'y Gen. at 626.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 626-28.
Relation of the President to Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 453, 469-70
Id. at 469.
Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 463.
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and to change it into a parliamentary despotism" with a "nominal execu'32
tive chief utterly powerless.
Still, Cushing notes a difference between statutes that designate a
particular executive officer as the agent of administration and those that
grant authority to the President in name. Where the statute designates
an officer, the President's choice of agent to implement the law is "fixed,"
and the President's order will be given to the particular officer designated. 33 Thus, for Cushing, the Constitution itself requires that all discretionary authority granted by Congress to the executive branch official
conform to the will of the President; on this view, a grant of power to an
executive official specifies the agent through whom the President must
act, but does not, as Wirt argues, grant independent legal discretion to
the official himself.
These contrasting visions of the President's statutory powers reverberated in the opinions of subsequent attorneys general. 34 But, as noted
above, the full scope of their disagreement has not been resolved by the
Supreme Court. Marbury v. Madison allows for a narrow class of duties
granted to executive officials with which the President may not interfere. 35 These duties fall on one side of the sharp distinction Marbury
forges between executive acts that may be examined by courts and those
that may not. On the one hand, where the executive officer "possesses a
constitutional or legal discretion," the officer "is to conform precisely to
the will of the President. ' 36 "[N]othing can be more perfectly clear,"
Chief Justice Marshall intones, than that duties falling into that bundle
"are only politically examinable." 37 On the other hand are ministerial
duties, involving no discretion, upon which individual rights depend.
Marbury grants that where a "specific duty is assigned by law" directing an
officer "to perform certain acts," that person, as "an officer of the law,"
can be held legally accountable for his actions if individuals' rights de38
pend upon the performance of that duty.
The Supreme Court confirmed in Kendall v. United States that when a
statute imposes a nondiscretionary duty of performance upon an officer,
the President lacks authority to order the officer not to perform the
32. Id. at 470.
33. Id. at 468.
34. See, e.g., Appeal of Illinois to the President, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 14, 16 (1864)
(relying on Wirt's previous opinion at I Op. Att'y Gen. 624 (1823)); Charwin Land Grant,
18 Op. Att'y Gen. 31, 33 (1884) (relying on 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 14 (1864) and sources cited
therein); Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 527,
527 (1863) (relying on Cushing's view that President may direct executive officers as they
are "executors of the will of the President"); see also Powell, Constitution, supra note 21, at
33-34, 148 (discussing Wirt's and Cushing's opinions, their relation, and providing
references to their opinions in later opinions of attorneys general).
35. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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duty. 3 9

Congress had enacted a statute that required the Postmaster General to grant a financial credit to particular parties in the amount determined by a government solicitor. The performance of this duty was
"mere [ly] ministerial"; under the act, the Postmaster General was "vested
with no discretion or control over the decisions of the solicitor." 4 0 In
Kendall, the Court rejected the suggestion that based on the Take Care
Clause the President possessed an authority to direct the Postmaster General's conduct. Such a construction "would be clothing the President
with a power entirely to control the legislation of congress." 4' Rather,
where the duty imposed by statute upon the officer is of a merely ministerial character, "the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to
42
control of the law, not to the direction of the President."
Together Kendall and Marbuy support the view that when a statute
grants authority to an official to perform a merely ministerial, nondiscretionary act, the President may not order the official to withhold the action. But what of a statute that grants an executive official legal discretion? Such statutes, we know, make up the critical core of delegations in
the administrative state. Kendall clearly concerned the exercise of ministerial duties, so it does not define the scope of the President's authority
over an official with delegated discretion. 43 Marbuy also provides little
guidance. 44 Administrative law has overcome Marbury's sharp distinction
between, on the one side, actions that are political, where conforming to
the will of the President is required and judicial review is unavailable,
and, on the other, actions involving no discretion, where compliance with
the statutory mandate cannot be disturbed by the President and judicial
enforcement is available. As Peter Strauss has pointed out, that distinction obscures "the vast middle ground that is the home of administrative
law."'45 A fundamental premise of contemporary administrative law is
that agency officials are legally accountable for their decisionmaking,
even when it involves the exercise of discretion. 46 But if discretion no
39. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838).
40. Id. at 610-11.
41. Id. at 613.
42. Id. at 610.
43. Indeed, it is on precisely these grounds that Cushing distinguished Kendall to
support his view that the President controls all executive officials' discretion: "As the law
now stands expounded by the Supreme Court," Cushing writes, "it is conceded that a head
of an executive department of the Government, in the administration of the various and
important concerns of his office, is continually required to exercise judgment and
discretion .... In general, his duties are not merely ministerial." Office and Duties of
Attorney General, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 326, 345-46 (1854).
44. For a discussion of Marbury's contribution to the foundations of administrative
law, see Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative Law
Decision, 37J. Marshall L. Rev. 481 (2004).
45. Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 965, 977 (1997)
[hereinafter Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking].
46. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2000)
(" [R] eviewing court shall ... hold unlawful .. .agency action, findings, and conclusions
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longer excludes judicial review, does it still require that the official
granted the authority "conform precisely to the will of the President"?
B. The Ineluctable Question of Statutory Authorization
It is that open question-that is, the authority of the President to
direct the discretionary powers delegated to officials-the contemporary
debate pursues. The question involves both a constitutional and statutory
component. The constitutional component asks whether (and when) the
Constitution requires that the President have the power to direct the discretion of executive officials granted authority by statute. The statutory
question asks when a statute can be construed to grant directive authority
to the President. But regardless of the position taken on the constitutional issue, one must address the statutory question.
The unavoidability of the statutory question is obvious for those, in
company with Wirt, who take the view that neither the Take Care Clause
nor the Vesting Clause grants the President broad directive authority.
On that view, the President's directive authority is resolved through statutory interpretation.
But, as noted at the outset, even proponents of the strongly unitary
conception of the executive cannot avoid this question of statutory interpretation. On the strongly unitary view of the executive, the Constitution
requires that all executive power be vested in the President, and as a result, "executive officers can act only in the President's stead."4 7 But a
constitutional requirement of course does not itself imply that the legislation complies with it. Thus strong unitarians must ask what is the most
natural reading of delegations to executive officials, and whether it is permissible based on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to imply authority to the President from delegations to executive officials. Part II.D
below addresses the unitarian's reliance on constitutional avoidance.
C. Statutory Powers Implied by PresidentialInfluence
Dean Elena Kagan's article, PresidentialAdministration,4 8 provides the
most developed statutory argument that the President's directive authority extends to all grants of authority to executive officials. 4 9 The statutory
question, as Kagan frames it, is a matter of choice between two different
interpretive principles or presumptions: one in which delegations to the
agencies are read to grant authority to the agency official alone, and anfound to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (stating that
APA § 702 established presumption of judicial review for one adversely affected by agency
action).
47. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 595.
48. Kagan, supra note 8.
49. For an argument that the scope of the President's implied statutory powers
depends on a functional analysis of the power at issue, see Harold H. Bruff, Presidential
Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 Yale L.J. 451, 495-506 (1979).
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other in which these delegations are read to authorize the official speci50
fied, rather than other agency officials, but also the President.
Kagan's own answer is that reading delegations to agency officials as
authorizing the President's directive authority "reflect[s], more accurately than any other [interpretive principle], the general intent and un52
Kaderstanding of Congress," 5' and has greater policy justification.
gan's argument for this position on Congress's intentions is based on a
comparison between delegations to independent and executive agencies.
When Congress delegates authority to an independent agency, Kagan
writes, Congress aims "to insulate agency decisionmaking from the President's influence." 53 The limits on the President's removal power over
independent agency officials mean that these officials are not
subordinate to the President, and thus Kagan suggests it would be odd for
Congress to have made these officials subject to the President's directive
54
authority.
In contrast, when Congress grants power to an executive branch official, Kagan notes that it delegates to an official that the President nominates, may remove at will, and may subject to extensive procedural requirements. 55 In view of these controls and the norms of deference
executive branch officials give to the President's views, Kagan reasons that
"when Congress delegates to an executive official, it in some necessary
and obvious sense also delegates to the President." 56 The difficulty in
distinguishing between the President's ability to influence agency officials
and actually directing their exercise of delegated authority "provides reason to doubt any congressional intent to disaggregate them, in the ab'57
sence of specific evidence of that desire.
Kagan contends that the fact that Congress does delegate power directly to the President poses no objection to her view. For Kagan-as for
Cushing-delegations to the President grant something that delegations
to agency officials do not: These delegations grant the President the au50. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2326-27.
51. Id. at 2328.
52. Id. at 2330-46.
53. Id. at 2327. Kagan proceeds from the assumption, reflected in current law, that
Congress has the constitutional authority to impose for-cause restrictions on the
President's removal powers. See id. at 2326; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
691-93 (1988) (upholding constitutionality of statute providing good cause standard for
removal of independent counsel); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626-29
(1935) (upholding constitutionality of statute permitting President to remove Federal
Trade Commission members only for cause). Independent agencies are agencies whose
heads or members the President may not remove at will. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2247.
54. Kagan, supra note 8, at 2327.
55. Id. For examples of executive orders that impose procedural requirements on
executive branch officials, see Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 note (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 note (1988) (repealed 1993).
56. Kagan, supra note 8, at 2327.
57. Id. at 2328.
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thority to choose which lower-level official the President wishes to implement the delegated authority, whereas a delegation to executive officials
"deprives the President of this choice." 5 8 In view of that distinction, Kagan suggests that the negative implication from delegations to the President alone does not undermine the interpretive presumption that "the
President has ultimate control over all executive agency decisions. '5 9
Kagan then acknowledges what would count as a basis for departure
from her position:
Only if Congress sometimes stipulated that a delegation of
power to an agency official was subject to the ultimate control of
the President-which Congress has not, to my knowledgewould a claim of this kind (that is, a claim relying on the negaof other statutes) succeed in defeating my
tive implication
60
argument.
II.

MIXED DELEGATIONS AND THE CASE AGAINST IMPLIED STATUTORY

AUTHORIZATION OF THE PRESIDENT

If Congress's legislative practice were to name only an agency official
or the President alone as the statutory delegate, then the difference between a delegation to an independent agency and an executive agency
would provide a basis to embrace the view that the President has directive
authority under delegations to executive officers. Congress, however, has
a more varied practice in selecting the officers to whom it delegates authority than Kagan acknowledges. As this Part shows, many statutes condition the grant of authority to either the President or the agency on the
approval, direction, control, findings, or involvement of the other. I refer
to these as "mixed agency-President delegations." Congress has several
different varieties of these delegations. From the earliest days of the republic, it has delegated authority to an agency to act subject to the President's control. 61 Congress also has delegated authority to the President
to act though a specified agent, 62 and to the President to act upon the
recommendation of a cabinet secretary 63 or the joint recommendation of
64
cabinet secretaries.
58. Id. at 2329; see also Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op.
Att'y Gen. 453, 468 (1855).
59. Kagan, supra note 8, at 2329.
60. Id. at 2329-30.
61. See infra Part II.A.1.
62. See infra Part II.A.2.
63. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § lila (2000) ("[Tihe President of the United States is
authorized, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior, to add to the said
Mesa Verde National Park, Colorado, by executive proclamation."); 16 U.S.C. § 693
("[Tihe President of the United States is authorized, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture, to establish by public proclamation certain specified areas within
Ouachita National Forest as game sanctuaries and refuges."); 43 U.S.C. § 121 (2000)
("Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior, the President may order the
discontinuance of any land office and the transfer of any of its business and archives.").
64. For example, 16 U.S.C. § 192b provides:
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This Part argues that in view of these express provisions of presidential control in delegations to executive officials, delegations to executive
officials alone-"simple delegations"-should not be read to grant directive authority to the President. 65 Part V offers a defense of the underlying
appeal of this more narrow construction of the scope of the President's
authority in view of the President's institutional advantages over
Congress.

66

The President of the United States is authorized, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of the Interior, and with respect to lands located in a national forest
upon the joint recommendation of the Secretaries of Interior and of Agriculture,
to add to the Rocky Mountain National Park, in the State of Colorado ....
And 16 U.S.C. § 552a provides:
The President, upon recommendation of the Secretaries of the Interior and
Agriculture, may, by Executive order, when in his judgment the public interest
would be best served thereby and after reasonable notice has been given through
the Department of the Interior, restore any reserved national-forest lands covered
by a cooperative agreement with the Secretary of Agriculture ....
65. Nor should simple delegations be read to grant authority to the President but
foreclose the agent through whom those powers must be implemented.
66. Scholars have defended the view that the President lacks directive authority under
statutes that delegate power to other officers, but have not focused on the extent to which
mixed agency-President delegations strengthen this position. Rather, to the extent that
these delegations surface, scholarly focus has been largely on Congress's early statutes
granting authority to Secretaries subject to the President's control (and their implications
for the unitary executive debate). Pildes and Sunstein, for instance, take the position that
the President lacks directive authority under statutes delegating to agencies. With regard
to mixed agency-President delegation, they comment without elaboration that "[s]ome
support for this understanding is provided ... by early opinions of the Attorney General."
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1, 25 n.9 7 (1995). Harold Bruff also takes the position that the President lacks directive
authority. Bruff cites Wirt's opinion in support of this view, but does not elaborate on the
implications of mixed agency-President delegations for the interpretation of simple
delegations to agencies. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency
Rulemaking, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 533, 539 & n.37 (1989). For additional examples of
scholarly exploration of Congress's early authority-granting statutes, see Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 9, at 647-63 (describing Congress's early practice of granting authority
to Secretaries subject to President's control and its bearing on unitary executive debate);
Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 211, 239-42 (1989) (same); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27-30 (1994) (same); Peter M.
Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 596, 615-16 (1989) (same); Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of
Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. Rev. 59, 71-75
(1983) (same); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive
During the First Half-Century, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1451, 1480 (1997) (noting that early
Congress did not initially make Treasury subject to presidential control). Peter Strauss
concludes that the agencies to whom Congress assigns responsibility, and not the
President, have ultimate decisionmaking power, and notes that attorneys general
.vacillated" on the President's directive power, but does not focus on Congress's practice
of granting delegations to agencies subject to presidential control. See Strauss, Place of
Agencies, supra note 21, at 605 & n.124, 649-50.
Robert Percival is the notable contemporary exception. He notes the existence of one
mixed agency-President delegation of recent vintage as a basis to argue against a broad
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A. Mixed Agency-President Delegations
1. Conditional Delegations: Authorizing Agents Subject to the President's
Control. - From Congress's earliest years, it has enacted statutes that expressly condition the grant of authority to an official on the oversight of
the President. In the statute that first established the Department of the
Navy in 1789, for instance, the Secretary of the Navy's authority was
granted expressly conditioned upon presidential direction. That delegation reads:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That there
shall be an executive department under the denomination of
the Department of the Navy, the chief officer of which shall be
called the Secretary of the Navy, whose duty it shall be to execute such orders as he shall receive from the President of the
United States, relative to the procurement of naval stores and
materials and the construction, armament, equipment and emconnected
ployment of vessels of war, as well as all other matters
67
with the naval establishment of the United States.
Similarly, a statute enacted in 1789 directed the Secretary of War to
"conduct the business of the said department in such manner, as the
President of the United States shall from time to time order and instruct. ' 6 8 Likewise, the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs
(later renamed the Secretary of State) was ordered to perform duties "intrusted to him by the President" relative to foreign affairs "in such manner as the President of the United States shall from time to time order or
instruct. '69 In contrast, the early statute granting power to the Secretary
of the Treasury did not condition the Secretary's authority on the President's direction, 70 and the later statute permanently establishing the Post
construction of the President's directive authority. See Robert V. Percival, Presidential
Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 Duke L.J. 963,
1008 & n.258 (2001). Congress's practice of enacting mixed delegations also caught the
attention of commentators in the 1920s.
Going back further, James Hart posited that these delegations did not support an
inference that the President could not bind the discretion of agencies where the
delegation made no mention of the President. See James Hart, The Ordinance Making
Powers of the President of the United States 194-95 & n.30 (1924). I respond to this
argument in Part II.C. John Preston Comer also noticed these early delegations (as well as
some later ones) as part of his survey of delegated authority. See Comer, supra note 20, at
51-67.
67. Act of Apr. 30, 1789, ch. 35, § 1, 1 Stat. 553, 553.
68. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 49, 50 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 301 (2000)). In 1798, the Secretary of War was also directed to "provide, at the public
expense, under the direction of the President of the United States, all necessary books,
instruments and apparatus, for the use and benefit of said regiment." Act of Apr. 27, 1798,
ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 552, 553 (repealed 1802).
69. Act ofJuly 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 28, 28-29 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2651 (2000)).
70. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 65-66 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 31 U.S.C. (2000)); see also Corwin, supra note 21, at 96 (noting that
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Office and the position of the Postmaster General did not condition the
7
vested authority on the President's involvement. '
Congress continued to condition grants of authority to executive officers on the President's oversight throughout the 1800s. In 1825, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury "under the direction of the
President" to adopt a measure for calculating the proof of liquors. 72 In
1828, Congress ordered the Secretary of the Treasury, "under the direction of the President," to establish rules and regulations "as the President... shall think proper" to establish fair appraisals of goods imported
into the United States. 73 In 1848, Congress prescribed that military penunlike Secretaries of State and War, Secretary of Treasury was granted power to act under
directions of Congress, not President). In a statute enacted nine days later that established
salaries for executive officials, Congress referred to the Secretary and Comptroller of the
Treasury as "Executive Officers of Government." Act of Sept. 11, 1789, ch. 13, § 1, 1 Stat.
67, 67. Scholars dispute whether the latter act supports or contradicts the view that the
early Congress had a unitary conception of the executive. Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Yoo,
supra note 66, at 1480 n.92 (arguing that Act of Sept. 11, 1789 belies claim that Act of Sept.
2, 1789 did not establish Treasury as under President's control), with, e.g., Casper, supra
note 66, at 240 (arguing that Act does not establish that Treasury was viewed as executive
department), and Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 27 & n.123, 28 (same). But
regardless of one's position on that question and the more general one whether the
Constitution establishes a unitary executive, the interpretation question regarding the Act
expressly granting authority to the Treasury remains.
71. Act of May 8, 1794, ch. 23, § 3, 1 Stat. 354, 357.
72. Act of Jan. 12, 1825, ch. 4, 4 Stat. 79, 79-80 (repealed 1956).
73. Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 55, § 10, 4 Stat. 270, 274 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 331). Congress enacted other grants of authority to the Secretary of the Treasury
subject to the President's control in the same period:
That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the direction of
the President of the United States, from time to time, to establish such rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with the laws of the United States, as the
President... shall think proper, to secure a just, faithful, and impartial appraisal
of all goods, wares, and merchandise . . . imported into the United States ....
Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 227, § 9, 4 Stat. 583, 592, and
[T]he Secretary of the Treasury... is... authorized, with the approbation of the
President of the United States, to cause to be issued . . . treasury notes as the
President may think expedient in payment of supplies, or debts . . . and the
Secretary of the Treasury is further authorized, with the approbation of the
President of the United States, to borrow . . . such sums as the President may
think expedient, on the credit of such notes.
Act ofJune 30, 1812, ch. 111, § 4, 2 Stat. 766, 767. For additional examples of delegations
to Secretaries subject to presidential control, see Act of Mar. 2, 1827, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 236,
236-37 ("[Tlhe surveyor general, under the direction of the President . . . is hereby,
authorized and required to cause to be surveyed, marked, and designated, the northern
boundary line of the state of Indiana .... "); Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 102, § 1, 3 Stat. 534,
534 ("[I] t shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to provide, by contract, which
shall be approved by the President ... for building lighthouses, erecting beacons or land
marks . . . ."); Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 88, 3 Stat. 520, 520 ("IT]he Secretary of War ...

is

hereby, authorized, under the direction of the President . . . to cause to be sold such
military sites... as may have been found, or become useless for military purposes."); Act of
Mar. 2, 1812, ch. 34, § 1, 2 Stat. 691, 691 ("[T]he Secretary of the Treasury ... is hereby
authorized and empowered, under the directions of the President . . . to purchase of
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sions would be granted under rules and regulations "as the Secretary of
War, with the approbation of the President of the United States, may prescribe. '7 4 In 1851, Congress granted authority to the Postmaster General
to set rates for international postage "by and with the advice and consent
of the President."75 In 1861, Congress delegated authority to the Secretary of Treasury, "with the approbation of the President," both to issue
regulations for the shipboard enforcement of the revenue laws 76 and for
the appointment of inspectors and appraisers at ports. 77 And in 1862,
Congress provided that regulations of the Secretary of the Navy would be
recognized as regulations of the Navy Department, subject to alterations
that the "Secretary of the Navy 78
may adopt, with the approbation of the
President of the United States."
Congress maintained this practice from the late nineteenth century
through the contemporary period. For instance, following the Civil War,
Congress granted the Secretary of the Treasury, "with the approval of the
President," the power to suspend commerce with states under the control
of insurgents, 79 and later granted the Secretary of the Treasury, "subject
to the approval of the President," authority to regulate the printing of
reproductions of U.S. postage stamps for philatelic purposes in articles,
books, and advertisements. 80
The current statutes contain numerous examples of this sort of
mixed agency-President delegation. To give a sampling, Congress grants
the Secretary of Agriculture authority to make regulations with the force
and effect of law to carry out the provisions regarding agricultural production "with the approval of the President";81 grants the Secretary of the
Interior, upon the same condition, the authority to convey recreational
lands; 82 grants the Secretary of the Interior, "in such manner as the President may direct," authority to utilize property and resources of the fedWinslow Lewis, his patent right . . . ."); Act of May 3, 1802, ch. 52, § 10, 2 Stat. 193, 195

("[T]he marshal of the district of Columbia . . . is authorized and directed, with the
approbation of the President ...to cause a good and sufficientjail to be built.... ."); Act of
May 1, 1802, ch. 45, § 6, 2 Stat. 181, 182 ("[T]he Secretary of the Treasury, with the
approbation of the President, is hereby authorized to prescribe and establish such forms
and regulations, and the same from time to time, with like approbation, to alter and
amend . .

").

74. Act ofJuly 21, 1848, ch. 108, § 3, 9 Stat. 249, 250.
75. Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 20, § 2, 9 Stat. 587, 589.
76. Act ofJuly 13, 1861, ch. 3, § 2, 12 Stat. 255, 256 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 219 (2000)).
77. Id. § 1, 12 Stat. at 256 (repealed 1966).
78. Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 164, § 5, 12 Stat. 561, 565 (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. § 6011 (2000)).
79. Act ofJuly 2, 1864, ch. 225, § 5, 13 Stat. 375, 376-77 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. § 206).
80. Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 25, § 504, 62 Stat. 683, 713-14 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 504 (2000)).
81. 7 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000).
82. 16 U.S.C. § 459r (2000).
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eral government in constructing water conservation projects;8 3 grants the
Secretary of Transportation the authority to issue rules and regulations,
"subject to the approval of the President," regarding the anchorage of
vessels in times of emergency;8 4 grants the Secretary of Transportation
the authority, without a hearing, "but subject to the approval of the President," to suspend the permits of foreign air carriers;8 5 and grants the
Secretary of Treasury and the United States Postal Service joint authority,
"[w]ith the approval of the President," to issue regulations regarding the
86
shipment of valuables by the government.
In the last two decades, Congress has enacted many mixed agencyPresident delegations to the Secretaries of Defense and State. Congress
has granted the Secretary of Defense, "under the direction of the President," responsibility for procurement of military equipment and supervision of military personnelR 7 and has stipulated that the Secretary of Defense should, subject to the President's approval, report annually to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with policy guidance.8 8 Likewise,
Congress has authorized the Secretary of State, "[u] nder the direction of
the President," to administer the Department of State8 9 and to supervise
leasing, financing, and cooperative projects with a foreign country. 90
83. Id. § 590z.
84. 50 U.S.C. § 191.
85. 49 U.S.C. § 41304(b) (2000); see also id. § 44302(c) (granting Secretary of
Transportation authority "with the approval of the President" to provide insurance against
any risk arising from operation of civilian aircraft).
86. 40 U.S.C. § 17302(a) (Supp.II2002).
87. Foreign Military Sales Act, Pub. L. No. 90-629, § 42(c) (1), 82 Stat. 1320, 1327
(1968) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2791(d)(1) (2000)).
88. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-433, sec. 102, § 113(g) (2), 100 Stat. 992, 996 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 113(g)(2) (2000)).
89. Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-465, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 2071, 2078
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 3921 (a)).
90. Id.§ 2752(b). For additional examples, see E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-347, sec. 302(a), § 11331(d), 116 Stat. 2899, 2956 (current version at 40 U.S.C.
§ 11331 and codified at 40 U.S.C. § 11331 note) ("To ensure fiscal and policy consistency,
the Secretary shall exercise the authority conferred by this section subject to direction by
the President and in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget."); Act of Aug. 21, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-217, sec. 1,§ 501 (a)(2), 116 Stat. 1062,
1079 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 501 (a)(2)) ("The Secretary of Defense may
exempt the Department of Defense from an action taken by the Administrator of General
Services under this subchapter, unless the President directs otherwise, whenever the
Secretary determines that an exemption is in the best interests of national security.");
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 836(b),
115 Stat. 1012, 1192 (2001) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2302 note (Supp.II 2002)) ("[T]he
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services . . . a report
containing the Secretary's recommendations for.., authority that the Secretary (subject to
the direction of the President) determines necessary to support operations carried out to
combat terrorism."); International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292,
§ 101(c)(3), 112 Stat. 2787, 2792 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6411(c)(3)) ("Subject to the
direction of the President and the Secretary of State, the Ambassador at Large is
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2. Agency-Specified Delegations: Authorizing the President to Act Through
Specified Agents. - Congress also has an active contemporary practice of
delegating authority to the President with a specification of the agent
through whom the President must act.
In the current laws, for instance, Congress authorizes the President
to establish policies regarding the creation of employment opportunities
for the unemployed through the Secretary of Labor:
[T]o promote achievement of full employment under this chapter and the Employment Act of 1946, the President, through the
Secretary of Labor, shall develop policies and procedures and,
as necessary, recommend programs for providing employment
opportunities to individuals aged 16 and over in the civilian labor force who are able, willing, and seeking to work but who,
despite serious efforts to obtain employment, remain
unemployed. 91
This same basic structure of granting power to the President to act
through a specified official appears in numerous current laws. Current
law provides that the President "shall, through the Secretary of State,"
promulgate rules to carry out powers regarding international agreements
of the United States;9 2 it grants the President the power to direct the
Secretary of State to terminate air service agreements between the United
States and a foreign country when a determination of dangerousness is
made; 93 it stipulates that the President "should direct the Secretary of
State" regarding initiating global research on climate change; 94 it grants
authorized to represent the United States. . . ."); National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-189, § 1605(a), 103 Stat. 1352, 1598 (1989)
("[T]he Secretary of Defense may transfer to the Department of Energy, from funds
appropriated to the Department of Defense, such sums ...as the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Energy, with the approval of the President, determine are necessary for
Atomic Energy Defense Activities.").
91. 15 U.S.C. § 3116(a) (2000) (citation omitted).
92. 1 U.S.C. § 112b(e) (2000); see also Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-497, § 4(b)(6), 118 Stat. 4012, 4015 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701
note) (authorizing President "acting through the Secretary of State and the Permanent
Representative of the United States to the United Nations" to take actions against
Sudanese Government for crimes committed in Darfur region); Arms Control and
Disarmament Amendments Act of 1989 § 103, 22 U.S.C. § 2567 (amending section 27 of
Arms Control and Disarmament Act to require that "two Special Representatives shall
perform their duties and exercise their powers under the direction of the President and
the Secretary of State, acting through the Director").
93. 22 U.S.C. § 5605(b) (2) (F) (ii) (1).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 2952(a). For other research and awareness legislation, see Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 § 106(b), 22 U.S.C. § 7104(b) (granting
President authority "through the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of State," to "carry out programs to
increase public awareness" about trafficking); Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, sec. 6(g)(1), § 112A, 117 Stat. 2875,
2884 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7109) (empowering President "through the Council of
Economic Advisors, the National Research Council of the National Academies, the
Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, the
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the President, "through the Secretary of Defense," power to take posses95
sion of our system of transportation to transport troops in times of war;
and it empowers the President, "through the Secretary of Defense," to
take possession of steel plants to ensure the availability of steel products
96
required by the military.
Current law also grants the President the authority, "through the
Secretary of Transportation," to acquire foreign merchant vessels by
agreement, 97 and the power to "direct the Secretary of Treasury" to carry
out agreements entered into with Canada regarding the potato trade. 9 8
The President is further vested with the power "acting through the Under
Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and in consultation
with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency" and the
heads of other agencies, to promulgate regulations regarding natural resource assessments following discharges of oil. 99 Congress also has authorized the President "through the Secretary of Commerce" and other
officials designated in the act, to carry out the United States' proposal for
participation in international expositions.' 0 0 In a 2002 Act regarding
border security and visas, Congress defined the President as "the President of the United States, acting through the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, the Attorney General,"
and several other executive officials.' 0 1
Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, and the Director of Central Intelligence" to promote research issues related
to human trafficking); cf. Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998
§ 2(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5341 (2000) (requiring that President "acting through the Secretary
and in consultation with the Attorney General" develop a national strategy to combat
money laundering that shall address "any area the President, acting through the Secretary
and in consultation with the Attorney General, considers appropriate").
95. 10 U.S.C. § 2644 (2000).
96. 50 U.S.C. app. § 468(h) (2000); cf. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1992
§ 111, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2077(b) (1) (A) (requiring President "acting through the Secretary
of Defense" to "identify critical components and critical technology items for each item on
the Critical Items List of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified and Specified
Commands and other items within the inventory of weapon systems and defense
equipment").
97. 50 U.S.C. § 196.
98. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988
§ 304(d) (3) (A), 19 U.S.C. § 2112 note (2000).
99. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1) (2000).
100. Act of Sept. 8, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-254, § 2(a), 96 Stat. 808, 808; Act of Dec. 29,
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-169, § 2(a), 93 Stat. 1281, 1281.
101. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107173, § 2(6), 116 Stat. 543, 544 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1701(6) (Supp. 1I 2002)). In
President Bush's signing statement, he specifically objected on constitutional grounds to
this and other provisions requiring the President to coordinate with executive officials and
Congress:
The President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch
and take care that the laws be faithfully executed cannot be made by law subject
to requirements to exercise those constitutional authorities through a particular
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B. Negative Implicationsfrom Mixed Agency-President Delegations
Turning to the core question of how to construe discretionary delegations to executive officials, it should be clear that proponents of the
broad view of the President's directive authority are arguing for a statutory implication in favor of the President. They contend that "Secretary
of Labor" includes the President. If it does, it can do so only by an implied extension.
Congress's practice of enacting these two types of mixed agency-President delegations provides strong grounds to resist that implied extension. First, these statutes support the negative inference that when Congress simply delegates to an agency, without conditioning the delegation
on the President's approval, the statute denies the President directive authority (contrary to Kagan's and Cushing's suggestions). Second, Congress's practice of granting authority to the President to act through a
particular executive official calls into question the reading of delegations
to agency officials as granting the President directive authority but fixing
the agency through whom he or she must act (again pace Kagan and
Cushing).
1. The Negative Inferencefrom Mixed to Simple Delegations Within the Same
Act. - The strongest and most obvious case against Kagan's and Cushing's position relies on the principle of statutory interpretation that
"[w] here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."1 0 2 This principle is a specific application of the
general idea that the meaning conveyed by a statutory provision depends
upon the social, linguistic, and legal context of its enactment. 10 3 Drawing
member of the President's staff or in coordination or consultation with specified
officers or elements of the Government.
Statement on Signing the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, 1
Pub. Papers 795 (May 14, 2002). "Accordingly," the President wrote, "the executive branch
shall treat the purported requirements as precatory." Id. This statement suggests that the
current administration views the statutory construction of these provisions as clear and in
accordance with the interpretations defended below.
102. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)); see
also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 454-62 (2002) (relying on same
principle). The negative inferences for the meaning of one statutory provision drawn from
another are stronger "[t]he more apparently deliberate the contrast . . . as applied, for
example, to contrasting statutory sections originally enacted simultaneously." Field v.
Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75 (1995); see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997) (quoting
Field, 516 U.S. at 75).
103. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 55-61
(1994) (arguing that context is central to statutory interpretation); John F. Manning, The
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2456-70 (2003) (describing role of linguistic
context and social context in modern statutory textualism); see also FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) ("The meaning-or ambiguity-of
certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.").
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inferences from the inclusion or exclusion of language within the same
act relies on the idea that the whole act is a central part of the context for
its specific provisions. That idea assumes that it is appropriate for an interpreter to attach some level of coherence to a statute as a whole, and
not merely to particular provisions. The basis for that presumption could
be, as classical intentionalist theories maintain, that members of Congress
have actual shared intentions when enacting a piece of legislation. 104 Alternatively, the basis could be the ascription of a collective intent, as modern statutory textualist theories posit, based on the public meaning conveyed by the final legislative product-the statutory text itself.10 5 In any
event, the meaning of a statutory provision is a function in part of the
whole act in which it is included.' 0 6
For statutes that include both a mixed agency-President delegation
and a delegation to an official without conditions of presidential control
(a simple delegation), as many do, 10 7 this principle provides strong sup104. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, "Is That English You're Speaking?"
Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 967, 968 n.1,
972-82 (2004) (describing intentionalism as view that meaning of text is determined by
author's actual intent);John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev.
419, 429-30 (2005) [hereinafter Manning, Textualism] (describing presumptions of
classical intentionalism in statutory interpretation).
105. As Manning explains:
Ascribing that sort of objectified intent to legislators [based on how a reasonable
person conversant in applicable social conventions would read the statutory text]
offers an intelligible way for textualists to hold them accountable for whatever law
they have passed, whether or not they have any actual intent, singly or collectively,
respecting its details.
Manning, Textualism, supra note 104, at 433 (emphasis omitted).
106. Based on these principles, the Supreme Court has concluded that some statutory
provisions are in fact unambiguous even though they might be subject to several
interpretations if viewed in isolation. The Court's recent decision in Barnhart provides an
example, as John Manning notes. See id. at 445-47 (citing Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 445-46).
The statute in question established a scheme for the payments of health care benefits for
retired workers in the coal industry. The statute assigned retirees seeking payment of
benefits either to existing companies that had signed prior benefits plans (signatories) and
had employed the retiree, or to related companies of the signatory companies. Id. at 452
(citing 26 U.S.C. § 9701(c) (2) (2000)). The statute further provided that successors in
interest to related companies were subject to liability, but did not make any provision
concerning liability for successors in interest to signatories. See id. at 446 (citing 26 U.S.C.
§ 9701 (c) (2) (A)). In view of the inclusion of successor in interest liability for one class of
company and not for another, the Court refused to infer that successors in interest to
signatories were liable. See Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 452-53. "Where Congress wanted to
provide for successor liability in the Coal Act," the Court reasoned, "it did so explicitly, as
demonstrated by the other sections in the Act that give the option of attaching liability to
,successors' and 'successors in interest."' Id. In view of these statutory interpretation
principles, the Court concluded that the statute was "unambiguous," and that there was
therefore no occasion to defer to the Social Security Commissioner's contrary
interpretation. Id. at 461-62.
107. Compare, e.g., Act of Aug. 21, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-217, sec. 1, § 501 (a)(2), 116
Stat. 1062, 1079 (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 501 (a)(2) (Supp. II 2002)) (allowing Secretary of
Defense to exempt Department of Defense from certain actions of Act "unless the
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port for the conclusion that these two types of delegation have distinct
meanings.
A 1994 Act providing for a comprehensive reorganization of the
transportation laws provides a nice illustration.10 8 The Act includes
mixed agency-President delegations, delegations to the Secretary of
Transportation alone, and delegations to the President alone. The Act
grants, for instance, the Secretary of Transportation authority to suspend,
President directs otherwise"), with id. § 549 (d)(1), 116 Stat. at 1091 (codified at 40 U.S.C.
§ 549(d)(1)) (explaining that Secretary of Defense can determine whether to use surplus
personal property for educational activities); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 836(b), 115 Stat. 1012, 1192 (2001) (codified at 10
U.S.C. § 2302 note (Supp. II 2002)) (granting Secretary of Defense authority to secure
emergency procurements to combat terrorism "subject to the direction of the President"),
with id. § 312(2), 115 Stat. at 1051 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2703(b)) (granting Secretary
power to set up program to take care of "unexploded ordnance [and] discarded military
munitions"); International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292,
§ 101(c)(3), 112 Stat. 2787, 2792 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6411(c)(3) (2000)) (granting
authority to Ambassador at large to represent United States in religious freedom matters
"[s]ubject to the direction of the President and the Secretary of State"), with id. § 101(d),
112 Stat. at 2792 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6411 (d)) (directing Secretary of State to provide
funding for Ambassador at large); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-189, § 1605(a), 103 Stat. 1352, 1598 (1989) (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1531 note (2000)) (granting authority for Secretary of Defense to
transfer funds to the Department of Energy for atomic energy defense "with the approval
of the President"), with id. § 131 (a) (1), 103 Stat. at 1381 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 221 (2000)) (ordering Secretary of Defense to cease production of F-14 aircraft); Foreign
Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-465, § 201 (a), 94 Stat. 2071, 2078 (codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. § 3921(a)) (directing Secretary of State to run foreign service "under the
direction of the President"), with id. § 105(d)(1), 94 Stat. at 2078 (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. § 3905(d)(1)) (directing Secretary to establish minority recruitment program);
Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-108, sec. 2(a),
§ 27, 91 Stat. 871, 871 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2567) (granting Special
Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations powers to act "under the
direction of the President and the Secretary of State, acting through the Director"), with
id. sec. 4, § 37(a)(1), 91 Stat. at 871-72 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2577)
(requiring Director to report to Congress on arms control proposals); Foreign Military
Sales Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-629, § 2(b), 82 Stat. 1320, 1322 (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. § 2752) (making Secretary of State responsible "under the direction of the
President" for supervision of sales under Act), with id. § 36(a), 82 Stat. at 1326 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2776) (directing Secretary of State to transmit to Congress
semiannual reports on all exports under Act); Act of June 6, 1942, ch. 380, § 1, 56 Stat.
326, 326-27 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 459r (2000)) (authorizing Secretary of
Interior with "the approval of the President" to convey or lease "recreational
demonstration projects"), with id. § 2, 56 Stat. at 327 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 459s) (authorizing Secretary of Interior to file map with National Archives for each
project enumerated in section); Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, § 10(c), 48 Stat. 31,
37 (1933) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000)) (authorizing Secretary of
Agriculture, with "approval of the President" to make regulations to carry out its
provision), with id. § 6(b), 48 Stat. at 33 (repealed 1935) (authorizing Secretary to make
contracts with cotton producers to sell cotton).
108. Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C. (2000)).
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without a hearing "but subject to the approval of the President," ''- the
operation of foreign air carriers in the United States based on certain
findings. A neighboring provision separately authorizes the Secretary
alone to issue permits to provide foreign air transportation.' 10 In a separate provision, the Act grants the President sole emergency powers to determine if a foreign government is acting inconsistently with an international convention on unlawful aircraft and to suspend operations of air
carriers to and from that country.' I Moreover, the Act separately authorizes the President and several Secretaries to stop an air carrier from traveling between a foreign airport and the United States but imposes differ112
ent conditions on the President and Secretaries for doing so.
The proximity of these provisions to one another within a single act
of Congress, as well as the distinct powers granted by these delegations,
suggests that delegations to specified officials convey powers distinct from
those delegated to officials subject to conditions of presidential approval
or oversight. Indeed, for these statutes, if the simple delegation to the
official were construed to grant the President directive authority, the express provision of presidential control in mixed agency-President delegations would be doing little work. 1 3 The natural construction to avoid
that implication is that simple and mixed delegations do not both grant
authority to an agency conditioned on the President's directive control.
2. The Negative Implicationfrom Mixed Delegations to Simple Delegations
Generally. - More general considerations suggest that these same nega109. Id. sec. 1, § 41304(b), 108 Stat. at 1127 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 41304(b) (2000)); see also id. sec. 1, § 44302(b), 108 Stat. at 1168 (codified as amended
at 49 U.S.C. § 44302(b)) (allowing Secretary of Transportation to provide insurance to
aircraft operator "only with the approval of the President").
110. Id. sec. 1, § 41302, 108 Stat. at 1126 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 41302).
111. Id. sec. 1, § 40106(b), 108 Stat. at 1103 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40106(b)).
112. Compare id. sec. 1, § 44907(d)(1)(D), 108 Stat. at 1210-11 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44907(d) (1) (D)) (authorizing President to "prohibit an air carrier
or foreign air carrier from providing transportation between the United States and any
other foreign airport" if that air carrier also serves airport which Secretary of
Transportation has decided does not maintain adequate security), with id. sec. 1,
§ 44907(e), 108 Stat. at 1210 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44907(e)) (mandating
Secretary of Transportation, with approval of Secretary of State, to suspend right of air
carrier to provide air transportation to foreign airport based on specified findings of
Secretary of Transportation).
113. One objection to this view is that express provisions for presidential involvement
in mixed agency-President delegations could be read to create an affirmative obligation on
behalf of the agency to confer with the President, but that simple delegations do not
preclude presidential direction. On this view, express provisions for presidential control
serve to emphasize the agency's need to consult with the President and the President's
accountability for the decision. The difficulty with this objection, however, is that it
requires interpreting statutory grants of authority in a way that separates the President's
statutory authority and accountability. It requires accepting the view that Congress sought
to grant authority to the President without express accountability. The importance of
transparency as a basis for political accountability counsels against such a separation.
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tive implications attach to simple delegations to executive officials even
when the statute granting authority to an executive official does not also
include a mixed agency-President delegation. The relevant legal context
for construing statutory language extends beyond the four corners of the
act in which the language was enacted. As the Supreme Court has frequently noted, "courts do not interpret statutes in isolation, but in the
context of the corpusjurisof which they are a part, including later enacted
statutes."1 14 As we have seen, mixed agency-President delegations have
been used since the earliest days of the republic and are still used frequently in current statutes. They thus provide a form of statutory usage
and congressional practice that informs the interpretation of simple delegations to executive officials. 1 t 5 The wide-ranging practice of enacting
mixed delegations alongside simple delegations suggests that in this legal
context simple and mixed delegations have distinct meanings, and that a
reasonable legislator would have used a mixed agency-President delega1 16
tion if he or she sought to grant the President directive control.
114. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281 (2003) (Scalia, J.); see also FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) ("It is a 'fundamental canon of
statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.'" (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep't of
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989))).
115. A widely noted contemporary Supreme Court application of these principles is in
West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, in which the Court concluded that the
provision for "a reasonable attorney's fee" within a civil rights statute did not include
recovery of a plaintiff's expert fees. 499 U.S. 83, 92 (1991) (interpreting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b) (2000)). The Court's principal ground for doing so was that numerous other
statutes explicitly provided for expert fees in addition to attorney's fees. Id. at 88. The
Court concluded that this broad range of "statutory usage shows beyond question that
attorney's fees and expert fees are distinct items of expense," and that interpreting
attorney's fees to include expert fees would render the separate provision of expert fees in
numerous statutes a redundancy. Id. at 92. For a discussion of West Virginia University
Hospitals as an application of textualist principles, see Manning, Textualism, supra note
104, at 441-44. But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of
Incoherence: A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,
and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 687, 691-98 (1992)
(criticizing West Virginia University Hospitals as ignoring civil rights context of fee provision
and specifically prior practice of awarding expert fees in civil rights cases); William W.
Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 171,
189-93, 225-29 (2000) (criticizing inferences across statutes and distinguishing them from
application of expressio unius canon within single statute).
116. One objection to this broader negative implication arises from Congress's
practice of specifying that a power is to be exercised "in the judgment" of a particular
official. For instance, amidst a general authorization to the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development to regulate insurance for financial institutions involved in the housing
market, Title 12 provides:
The Secretary is authorized to waive compliance with regulations heretofore and
hereafter prescribed by him with respect to the interest and maturity of the terms,
conditions, and restrictions under which loans, advances of credit, and purchases
may be insured under this section and section 1706(a) of this title, if in his
judgment the enforcement of such regulations would impose an injustice upon an
insured institution [and meets other specified conditions].
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While the same provisions in different statutes need not carry the
same meaning and arguments from statutory usage are sometimes controversial, 117 the grounds for applying a negative implication here are
particularly strong. Where, for instance, one statute grants powers to an
official subject to presidential control and another statute grants powers
to the same official without those conditions, it would be a strain to suggest a reasonable official or other interpreter would not view these statutes as conveying distinct duties: Under X statute my discretion is conditioned on express presidential direction, and under Y statute it is not.
Moreover, the statutory question here is both recurrent and structural. The question of to whom Congress should delegate authority is not
an obscure or technical question; it arises whenever Congress enacts a
statute that grants powers. As we have seen, Congress has been making
textual distinctions between delegations to officials alone and delegations
conditioned on the President's oversight since its earliest days."1 8 Indeed, when Congress delegates authority, the choice of the recipient of

12 U.S.C. § 1703(d) (2000) (emphasis added). The specification that particular powers
are granted "in the judgment" of an official, the objection runs, suggests that a simple
delegation should not be read as vesting independent discretion and authority in the
official. This objection thus aims to deploy a similar negative implication to that advanced
here against the position I defend.
There are, however, at least two different responses to this objection. First, the "in the
judgment" of the official language frequently appears in the context of provisions that
grant a broader range of discretion-close to a totality-of-the-circumstances determination
under the statute-such as that involved in decisions to waive compliance with regulations
and settle claims. See, e.g., id.; see also 7 U.S.C. § 603(b) (2) (2000) (granting settlement
power to Secretary of Agriculture as "in his judgment may be deemed advisable, and to
carry out the provisions of this section"); 10 U.S.C. § 3038(b)(4) (2000) (providing
Secretary of Defense authority to waive specified requirements for appointment of Chief
Army Reserve if "in the judgment of the Secretary of Defense" officer is qualified and
waiver "is necessary for the good of the service"); 25 U.S.C. § 161c (2000) (providing that
funds held in tribal fund accounts which "in the judgment of the Secretary of the Interior,
[are] not required for the purpose for which the fund was created" may be transferred to
the Treasury); 30 U.S.C. § 209 (2000) (granting Secretary of Interior power to waive and
suspend royalties on leases "whenever in his judgment" it is necessary "to promote
development" or the leases "cannot be successfully operated under the terms provided").
Second and more generally, the negative implication invoked by this objection is not as
strong as the implication from mixed agency-President delegations to simple delegations.
Specifically, the negative implication defended here is based on the difference between a
statute granting authority to one officer, such as an executive official, and granting
authority to an officer subject to the control of the President. In contrast, a simple
delegation to an executive official and a delegation to the official to act "in [his or her]
judgment" are relatively more similar and appear to be nearly cognate ways of granting
discretion and authority to the official, neither of which mention the President. The
negative implication advanced by the objection thus requires taking the view that when
Congress uses generally similar but not identical formulations to grant power to an official,
each formulation must be read to be mutually exclusive.
117. See supra note 115.
118. See supra Part II.A.
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the authority is a "crucial threshold decision[ ]."1 19 The structural choice
whether to delegate to the President, cabinet secretary, independent
agency or commission, government corporation, or some combination of
these actors affects how policy is made, which institutional actors will influence that policy, and the cost of monitoring the chosen delegate.' 20 It
also can determine which default procedures apply to implement the
power.1 21 As a result, "[a]ny notion that political actors might confine
their attention to policymaking and turn organizational design over to
1 22
neutral criteria or efficiency experts denies the realities of politics."

Empirical work confirms that Congress's choice of delegate matters
and matters to Congress. David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran demonstrate empirically that when there is divided government-when the majority in Congress and the President are from different parties-Congress
delegates relatively more frequently to actors with greater insulation from
the President's control. 123 Likewise, David Lewis shows that in periods of
unified government, the probability that agencies created will be insulated from presidential control decreased with the strength of the congressional majority; in periods of divided government, the probability
that agencies created will be insulated from presidential control in124
creased with the size of the congressional majority.
Congress's preferences for who receives power presumably would
not shift based on its relationship with the President if the choice of delegate were of little significance. From Congress's perspective, the difference between delegation to an executive or independent agency is likely
to be more significant than the distinction between delegating authority
to a cabinet secretary alone or to also make that secretary subject to direct
presidential control. But the choice between mixed and simple delegations must have some significance to Congress, especially in view of its
119. David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost
Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 153 (1999).
120. Id.
121. In the absence of another statutory provision, Congress's choice of delegate
determines whether the Administrative Procedure Act applies. The Supreme Court has
held that the APA does not apply to the President. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S.
788, 800-01 (1992). But the Act does apply generally to agency action. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 551 (1) (2000) (defining agency broadly to include any authority of government except
for certain specified institutions). Kagan argues that the Court's decision in Franklin
should not bar judicial review under the APA when the President directs an agency action
under a statute that grants power to the agency. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2351. Based
on that reading of Franklin, Kagan avoids the implication that the APA's application
depends on whether the President has directed the agency's action. Though Kagan notes
that the Court's decision in Franklin concerned a statute that committed the issue to the
President's discretion, she does not appear to dispute that under Franklin Congress can
avoid the application of the APA by delegating authority directly to the President. See id.
122. Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in Can the Government
Govern? 267, 268 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) [hereinafter Moe,
Bureaucratic Structure].
123. See Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 119, at 154-62.
124. See Lewis, supra note 3, at 58-69.
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enduring practice of enacting mixed agency-President delegations. Finally, how we construe to whom a statute grants power does not directly
define the statute's substantive scope or remedies. As a result, abiding by
the vocabulary of delegation established by congressional practice seems
less likely to allow a form of statutory usage to obscure more salient features of the statute's context than invoking statutory usage to construe its
substantive scope or remedial provisions.
3. The Analogy to the Determination of Which Agency "Administers" a
Statute. - A further source of support for courts not reading delegations to executive officials as including implied authorizations for the
President comes from an analogous question presented by the Chevron
doctrine. Within the context of defining the boundaries of the
application of the Chevron doctrine, courts must determine whether an
agency "administers" a particular statute. 2 5 Chevron deference applies
only to an agency's construction of a statute that the agency administers. 1 2 6 Under this doctrine, courts must make agency-statute pairings.
The basis for these pairings is whether the statute grants exclusive policymaking power to the agency invoking deference under Chevron; courts
routinely deny Chevron deference when an agency interprets a statute administered by another agency, 12 7 when the agency interprets a statute
that does not delegate authority to the agency, 128 or when the power to
125. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (framing standard of review applicable to "an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers").
126. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990) (denying Chevron
deference to agency's interpretation of statute it did not administer); Dep't of Treasury v.
FLRA, 837 F.2d 1163, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same). The discussion of judicial review in
Part III aims to define the set of statutes, if any, that the President "administers." See infra
Part III.D.
127. See, e.g., Gen. Servs. Admin. v. FLRA, 86 F.3d 1185, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(granting deference to General Services Administration (GSA), not FLRA, because GSA
administers statute); Div. of Military & Naval Affairs v. FLRA, 683 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1982)
(refusing deference to FLRA because GSA administers statute); Whaley v. Schweiker, 663
F.2d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that Secretary of Health and Human Services'
interpretation of regulations administered by Veterans Administrator did not qualify for
deference).
128. See, e.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (denying
Chevron deference for agency's interpretation of APA because agency is not charged with
administering Act); Arango Marquez v. INS, 346 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying
deference for INS interpretation of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996); Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 2003)
(denying deference for Bureau of Immigration Appeals interpretation of criminal statutes,
but granting deference to Bureau's construction of Immigration and Nationality Act);
Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Ass'n of Civilian Technicians,
Silver Barons Chapter v. FLRA, 200 F.3d 590, 592 (9th Cir. 2000) (denying deference to
FLRA's interpretations of Department of Defense Appropriations Act because FLRA does
not administer Act); Proftl Reactor Operator Soc'y v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
939 F.2d 1047, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (denying deference for agency's interpretation of
APA); Ill. Nat'l Guard v. FLRA, 854 F.2d 1396, 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (denying deference
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implement a statute has not been granted exclusively to a single
agency.

129

The manner in which the courts determine whether a particular
agency has been granted exclusive policymaking authority under the statute is revealing: They determine whether the agency is the express and
exclusive recipient of statutory authority. Thus, in circumstances in
which there is a conflict between the interpretation of the statutory delegate and a lower-level official within the department, courts apply deference to the statutory delegate's construction.1 3 0 Likewise, where there is
no express delegation of authority to the agency, there is no basis for
deference.

13 1

The denial of Chevron deference makes a crucial statutory point: For
agencies that are not the express and exclusive recipients of statutory authority, courts take the view that it is not permissible to construe these
statutes as implying authority for unmentioned officials. The General
Services Administration does not include the Federal Labor Relations Authority. 1 3 2 Indeed, if implications in favor of other agencies were permissible, then these decisions denying Chevron deference would require the
courts to engage in the standard Chevron two-step inquiry. 13 3 But these
decisions do not reach that second step.
for FLRA's interpretation of Technician Act and Schedules Act because FLRA does not
administer either).
129. See, e.g., Rapaport v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 216-17 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (stating that Chevron deference is not owed to Office of Thrift Supervision's
interpretation of statute because agency shares responsibility for administration with three
other agencies); 1185 Ave. of the Ams. Assocs. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 22 F.3d 494, 497
(2d Cir. 1994) ("' [W] here... Congress has entrusted more than one federal agency with
the administration of a statute... a reviewing court does not.., owe as much deference as
it might otherwise give if the interpretation were made by a single agency similarly
entrusted with powers of interpretation."' (quoting Lieberman v. FTC, 771 F.2d 32, 37 (2d
Cir. 1985))); Wachtel v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(suggesting that where statutory provision is administered by multiple agencies, Chevron
deference does not apply).
130. See, e.g., Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 17
F.3d 616, 626-27 (3rd Cir. 1994) (granting deference to Secretary of Labor's
interpretation, not Director of Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, because
Director was merely delegate of Secretary); see also Energy W. Mining Co. v. Fed. Mine
Safety & Health Comm'n, 40 F.3d 457, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that Secretary of
Labor's interpretation of Mine Act is entitled to deference where grants of authority to
Commission concerned only review of ALJ decisions, not grant of rulemaking power).
131. See, e.g., decisions cited supra note 128.
132. See supra note 127.
133. The canon of constitutional avoidance may take precedence over Chevron
deference in the sense that a court will construe an ambiguous statute to avoid a
constitutional question even if the agency has adopted a different construction. See, e.g.,
EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
574-75 (1988) (invoking avoidance and reversing agency interpretation generally entitled
to Chevron deference); Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir.
2002) ("[C]onstitutional avoidance canon of statutory interpretation trumps Chevron
deference."). The argument here, in contrast, relies on the idea that operation of the
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Because the core question at issue in this Chevron context is about
the identity of the recipient of statutory authority, the manner in which
courts make that determination provides a useful analogy to our question: If implications are not allowed with regard to agencies in the Chevron context, then why would it be permissible, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, to imply an authorization of power to the President in
delegations to executive officials? The only response would have to be
that the President is different. The President, of course, has constitutional status and sits in a hierarchically superior position to executive
agencies, not merely a horizontal one. But should the President's hierarchical position exempt him from the norm, visible in the Chevron context,
that directive authority resides where Congress has expressly placed it?
Congress's frequent delegations to the President alone or to the
President in mixed agency-President delegations, as well as the structural
importance of the recipient of delegated authority, suggest that these
provisions convey distinct meanings within American public law, and support the view that the most natural reading of delegations to executive
officials is that they do not by implication grant power to the President.
Kagan suggests that it ultimately may be impossible to determine
whether or not Congress sought to authorize presidential directive authority via its delegations to executive officials, and argues as a result that
the inquiry should turn on policy considerations-indeed the very policy
considerations that should guide congressional choice about whether to
grant or withhold directive authority to the President.1 3 4 With Congress's
practice of enacting mixed agency-President delegations in view, this
movement to policy may be less rapid. Still, Part V offers a defense of the
appeal of this narrower construction and the view of administrative law it
implies.
C. The Distinction Between Removal and Directive Authority
Perhaps the strongest objection to denying implied statutory authority to the President stems from the President's power to remove executive
officials. The core of this objection is that, at least with regard to officers
that the President may fire at will, the President can ensure that they
follow his will such that there is little practical difference between removal and directive authority, and therefore little reason to presume a
"congressional intent to disaggregate them." 13 5
canon of constitutional avoidance is barred if a Court concludes that a statute is
unambiguous for Chevron purposes.
134. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2330.
135. Id. at 2328; see also Proposed Executive Order Entitled "Federal Regulation," 5
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 59, 61 (1981) (suggesting it would be anomalous to attribute to
Congress intention to insulate officers subject to presidential removal from presidential
supervision); Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 24-25. Notice that the objection
addressed here is to statutory constructions this Article defends, not to arguments that the
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To be sure, the President has a wide variety of means to influence
executive officials. The President may shape the agencies' agendas
through appointments, may communicate informally and ex parte with
them, 136 and may exercise control over the vetting of their high-level
staff. Presidential regulatory review provides a mechanism for monitoring executive agency activities, 13 7 and agency heads generally have a
sense of loyalty to the President or commitment to the President's policies. 13 8 The President may exert control over agency litigation through
the Department of Justice, may fire the executive branch officials if they
do not fall in line, and may seek reappointment of other officers. All of
this authority means that the President is likely to be able to implement
his policy through executive branch agencies, and it will be difficult for a
court to police the line between presidential influence, on the one hand,
39
and presidential direction of agency action, on the other.1
More than one generation of commentators have argued that these
considerations support presuming a congressional intention to grant the
President authority to bind the exercise of discretion of agency heads
subject to removal. In the 1920s, James Hart, an early scholar of the
American administrative state and professor at Columbia Law School,
specifically addressed the significance of congressional delegation to
agency officials subject to the President's control. 140 Hart contended
that these delegations do not support the inference that the President
lacked authority to bind an agency's discretion when the delegation ran
only to the agency.1 4 1 With regard to statutes that simply confer authority
on an agency head without conditions of the President's control, Hart
argued that the President has the power to "control the exercise of their
discretion, for that control is implied in his power of removal."1 42 More
1 43
than eighty years later, Kagan also embraces this view.
Constitution requires that the President have directive authority under any grant of power
to an executive official or otherwise.
136. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 404-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (embracing
broad permissibility of ex parte contacts between White House and agencies during
informal rulemaking); see also Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex
Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 969, 987 (1980) (defending
cautious approach to limiting White House ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking).
137. See generally Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 11-33 (describing background
and effect of regulatory review orders).
138. See Harold J. Krent, Presidential Powers 25 (2005) (noting that presidents can
generally ensure that their priorities will be implemented by selecting individuals who
carry out those responsibilities).
139. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 25-26.
140. Hart, supra note 66, at 195 n.30.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Recall that Kagan suggests there are reasons to doubt that Congress seeks to
disaggregate removal and directive authority when it delegates to executive branch officers
because of the scope of influence the President has when he may remove the agency head
at will. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
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But the fact that the President has removal authority need not imply
that any statutory grant of authority to the official also gives the President
directive authority. The power to remove certainly does not logically require directive authority; it is in principle possible to vest independent
legal discretion in an official, even though the official is subject to removal by the President.14 4 Rather, the thrust of the objection is practical:
In view of the influence that removal power carries with it, what purpose
is there in making a distinction?
Consider a conflict between an executive officer and the President.
Whenever an executive officer refuses to carry out an action that the President directs (and does not choose to resign over the issue), the President
may either accommodate the official in some way or fire the official and
seek appointment of one more congenial to the President's policies. Firing typically has a much higher political cost to the President than (successfully) directing an official's exercise of discretion.1 4 5 President
Nixon's efforts to remove Archibald Cox as special prosecutor made apparent the political costs of firing an officer that refuses to heed the Presi14 6
dent's policies.
But that vivid moment of conflict is not the only circumstance in
which there is a practical difference between these powers. Rather, who
is granted express authority under the statute likely influences the relative bargaining positions of the agency and the President.1 47 Where the
agency official's exercise of discretion is explicitly conditioned on the
President's direction, as in many mixed agency-President delegations, the
statute provides the agency official no grounds to resist an otherwise lawful presidential directive. 148 In contrast, where the relevant delegation
144. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Oversight of Regulatory Decisionmaking,
36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443, 465 (1987) (noting formal distinction between President's power to
substitute his judgment for that of agency and power to fire after the fact).
145. See, e.g., Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal
Government Sue Itself?, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 893, 928-29 (1991) [hereinafter Herz,
Sue] (noting that removal is disruptive, slow, uncertain, and politically costily way to reverse
agency's decision); Percival, supra note 66, at 1003-04 (noting political cost to President of
firing officials); Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 25 (same).
146. See, e.g., Percival, supra note 66, at 1004 (describing political costs of Watergate
"Saturday Night Massacre"); see also Ken Gormley, Archibald Cox: Conscience of a Nation
361-71 (1997) (describing aftermath of Cox's firing).
147. See Percival, supra note 66, at 1005 (noting effect on bargaining that assignment
of delegation may make); see also Herz, Sue, supra note 145, at 928-29 (arguing that
assignment of authority to agency head rather than President grants less-than-functional
control over agency official).
148. All mixed agency-President delegations of course do not grant the President the
same powers over agency officials. For instance, as noted above, some mixed agencyPresident delegations grant the official power to act "under the direction of the President,"
and others condition the official's actions on "the approval of the President." See supra
Part II.A.1. The "under the direction of the President" formulation appears to give the
official no ground to resist a lawful presidential directive, whereas the "with the approval of
the President" formulation effectively gives the President a veto over the agency official's
action but does not itself require that the official follow a presidential direction to act in a
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runs to the agency official alone, the agency official may resist the President's direction on the ground that the statute delegates an independent
legal duty and discretion to the official, not the President. If we assume
that officials are more likely to resist the President's directions when they
have a statutory basis to view themselves as vested with independent discretion, then the choice of statutory delegate has practical effects. The
choice to delegate authority to an official increases the chances of an
executive official's resistance, and thus the prospect that the agency official will force the President to accommodate the official (to avoid the
higher political cost of a firing). Moreover, there is reason to presume
that such dynamics matter to Congress because they affect the range of
the President's practical powers.
Thus the principled distinction between the power to remove and
the power to direct makes a practical difference if we assume that perceived legal allocations influence how officials behave. Despite the fact
that the President will (and should) have tremendous influence over executive officials, that influence alone does not imply directive authority
from the President's removal power.
D. ConstitutionalAvoidance and Statutory Delegations
Suppose, then, that these arguments-ultimately in company with
the defense of the normative appeal of the vision of the administrative
law they produce, discussed in Part V-show that delegations to executive
officials do not grant the President directive authority. That conclusion is
important for proponents of a strongly unitary conception of the executive: If the best construction of simple delegations to officials (on statutory grounds alone) excludes the President's directive authority, then
unitarians must rely on principles of constitutional avoidance to accom14 9
modate their constitutional commitments.
particular way. Thus the extent to which a mixed agency-President delegation grants
independent discretion to a particular official and provides grounds to alter the relative
bargaining positions of the President and the agency official ultimately depends on the
particulars of the mixed agency-President delegation itself. See generally supra Part II.B.
149. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 89 (noting
that avoidance doctrines apply only when there is difference between court's
"preconstitutional" construction of statute and how statute is construed to avoid posing
constitutional question). Prominent defenders of a strongly unitary executive do not
elaborate this reliance on principles of constitutional avoidance. See, e.g., Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 9, at 595-96 & n.210, 661-62 (stating that President may personally act
under delegation to executive official and suggesting that background constitutional
understandings make these statutory readings clear); Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 66, at
1480 n.92 ("It is also far from clear that the absence of a specific provision authorizing
presidential direction of the Treasury Secretary supports any negatively-implied limits on
presidential control. Such silence is more properly viewed as ambiguous . . . ." (citing
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 559-99)). In practice, it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish the invocation of avoidance canons from clear statement rules. See, e.g., INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-30 (2001) (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
341, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) (suggesting that clear statement rule draws
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Defenders of a strongly unitary executive might invoke the classical
avoidance principle that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, one of which would be unconstitutional, a court's duty is to adopt the
construction that saves the act. Alternatively, they might turn to the modern avoidance principle that where there is more than one acceptable
reading of the statute, the court should adopt the reading that avoids a
serious question about the act's constitutionality, even without determining the constitutionality of the alternative construction. 150 It is worth
considering the basis for this reliance.
1. Are Simple Delegations Ambiguous? - For constitutional avoidance
to apply, the strong unitarian must show that, as a matter of preconstitutional statutory interpretation,1 5 1 there is ambiguity as to whether delegations to executive officials grant directive power to the President such
that it would be "fairly possible"' 52 to construe simple delegations that
way.
The statutory arguments presented thus far could support the conclusion that simple delegations to agency officials cannot be fairly construed to grant the President power. The specific statutory text, for example, "Secretary of Labor," refers to that official, not the President. The
congressional practice of enacting mixed agency-President delegations
strengthens the negative implication that simple delegations do not grant
powers to the President. Negative implications of this sort have been a
basis for the Supreme Court to find statutes unambiguous. 153 Moreover,
as noted above, within the application of the Chevron context, courts routinely find delegations to specific officials unambiguous.
2. A Serious ConstitutionalQuestion? - Constitutional avoidance principles of course do not apply at all if a statutory construction does not
even raise a serious constitutional question. 154 It is beyond the scope of
this Article to address the merits of the unitary executive reading of the

support from principles of constitutional avoidance). In this regard, a proponent of a
strongly unitary executive might argue that in view of the constitutional commitment to
the President's control over administration, a clear statement rule should apply to require
Congress to affirmatively bar presidential direction. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 9, at 661 (arguing that constitutional commitments to unitary executive suggest that
silence in early statutes about President's power to act directly under statute should not be
construed to exclude presidential directive powers).
150. See supra note 11 (defining classical and modern avoidance principles).
151. See Schauer, supra note 149, at 89 (identifying preconstitutional statutory
interpretation as step prior to application of avoidance).
152. See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 348 ("'When the validity of an act of the Congress is
drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided."' (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
62 (1932))).
153. See supra notes 102, 106 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 11.
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155
Constitution as a matter of original intention or structural principle;
the focus here is on how to read statutes that Congress has enacted. It is
still worth noting, however, that the more restrictive reading of the scope
of the President's directive authority defended here does not entail taking a position on the removal debate. In particular, one could embrace
the view that the President has directive authority only under express
delegations, but still take the position that the restrictions on the President's removal authority, such as the "for cause" removal provisions that
apply to independent agencies, are unconstitutional. Based on that possibility, proponents of the strongly unitary executive would have to show
that the powers granted to the President by unimpeded removal authority
over all federal law-implementing officials is not sufficient to satisfy the
Constitution's requirement of a unitary executive if the President does
not in addition have directive authority over all those officials.
Presidents, as noted, have extensive tools of control over executive
agencies other than directive authority. 156 Moreover, empirical studies
show that presidents have significant influence over policy in executive
and independent agencies. 15 7 Based on those premises, the case that restricted directive authority alone violates the Constitution would be
harder to justify as a matter of structural principle. A unitary argument
for implied directive authority could be made, but the grounds for doing
so may not be as broad as they might initially appear.

155. Compare Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 546-47 (providing originalist
defense of strongly unitary reading of executive), with Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1729-30 (1996) (challenging originalist argument
for strongly unitary executive position), Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 2-3 (rejecting
originalist argument for strongly unitary executive position, but defending unitary position
on other grounds), and Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative over Agencies and
Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of
the Unitary Executive, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 627, 634 (1989) (defending Congress's
"virtually plenary power" to structure administrative bureaucracy, including establishing
tenure of officers).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 136-139 (listing principal tools for
presidential control over agencies).
157. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in The New Direction in
American Politics 235, 269-71 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) (finding
greater presidential than congressional control over federal bureaucracy); Terry M. Moe,
Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 197, 207-18
(1982) (documenting correspondence between shifts in presidential administration and
policy shifts in several independent agencies); Steven D. Stehr, Top Bureaucrats and the
Distribution of Influence in Reagan's Executive Branch, 57 Pub. Admin. Rev. 75, 80 (1997)
(study finding that career bureaucrats in Reagan administration perceived political
appointees and 0MB officials as having most influence over policy); B. Dan Wood &James
E. Anderson, The Politics of U.S. Antitrust Regulation, 37 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1, 1 (1993)
(documenting influence of President and Congress on antitrust enforcement activity); B.
Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 85 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 801, 812-23 (1991) (documenting influence of political
appointments on policy in several executive and independent agencies).
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In sum, this Part has argued that the best construction of simple
delegations to agency officials does not read these as extending directive
authority to the President by implication. This conclusion forces proponents of a strongly unitary executive to invoke constitutional avoidance
principles. 58 One could conclude that constitutional avoidance principles are simply not available because simple delegations to executive officials are not ambiguous. Even if such statutes are open to multiple possible interpretations, defenders of the strongly unitary executive are
burdened with a difficult argument that the defended narrower constructions of simple delegations violate principles of constitutional structure.
Either way, these statutory constructions have consequences for judicial
review and the structure of the executive branch. Parts III and IV examine those implications.
III.

STATUTORY DELEGATIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

Based on the view that a grant of authority to an executive officer
authorizes the President to act in his own name or to bind executive officials, proponents of broad readings of the President's statutory powers
also argue that judicial deference to agency action should be a function
of the President's involvement. For instance, as noted at the outset, Kagan argues that the deferential rule of Chevron should apply to agency
action only when it follows from presidential involvement. 159 Others
have suggested that Chevron should apply to agencies by virtue of their
being the President's agents. 160 The fundamental idea underlying these
views is that the President "administers" all statutes delegating power to
executive officials in the sense that it is the President's, not the agency's,
exercise of discretion under the statute that is eligible for Chevron
deference.
158. The judicial application of constitutional avoidance principles is the subject of
vigorous challenges. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public
Choice to Improve Public Law 105 (1997) (arguing that judicial use of avoidance to
impose legislative will as far as possible actually "is probably both misconstruing the statute
and making its construction uncorrectable"); Schauer, supra note 149, at 87-88, 92
(arguing that application of constitutional avoidance decides constitutional question
rather than avoiding it, and falsely presumes Congress would prefer its outcomes).
Whether principles of constitutional avoidance properly apply to statutory interpretation
within the executive branch is a complex issue in its own right. See Jerry L. Mashaw,
Norms, Practices and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency
Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 501, 507-08 (2005) [hereinafter Mashaw,
Norms] (arguing against use of avoidance canons by agencies); Trevor W. Morrison,
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch 40-44 (July 15, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing for limited application of
avoidance canon within executive branch).
159. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2376-77 (proposing distinguishing between
independent and executive agencies for purposes of granting Chevron deference).
160. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power
to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 334 & n.406 (1994).
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This Part challenges that conception of judicial review. There is,
first, a lurking constitutional question. Ifjudicial deference to the President's statutory construction were constitutionally compelled, then the
arguments about the scope of the President's statutory powers in Part II
would make no difference to the framework of judicial review. But, as
Part III.A aims to show, even according to a strongly unitary conception
of the executive, Congress has the power to establish the standards of
judicial review for the President's statutory constructions. Thus the
framework of judicial review involves a question of statutory interpretation: When, if ever, should courts presume that Congress sought to grant
deference to the President's constructions of statutory authority?
Once within the domain of statutory interpretation, Part II's statutory conclusion that delegations to executive branch officials do not grant
the President authority implies that the President's constructions of statutes delegating power to other officials are not eligible for Chevron deference. Part III.B argues that the President does not "administer" those
statutes. But these same considerations also suggest a possible extension
of Chevron's application-namely, that Chevron deference should apply to
the President's own actions when they follow from statutory delegations
to the President in name. As Part III.C explains, those are the statutes the
President administers.
A. CongressionalAuthority over Standards of Statutory Review
The starting point for the argument that the scope of the President's
authority under a statute matters to judicial deference is that judicial deference to the President's assertions of statutory authority is not constitutionally required, but rather is within Congress's powers to prescribe. It is
useful to discuss briefly the basis for this premise, because without it statutory arguments have no bearing on the framework ofjudicial review. The
basic claim is that Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause provides it the power to establish standards of judicial review of
the President's actions, and that strongly unitary theories of the executive
do not pose an obstacle to this view.
An argument for this position can be built by examining Congress's
power to establish the standards of review over agency action. Congressional authority to establish the standard ofjudicial review for challenges
to actions of agency officials to whom Congress has granted authority is a
fundamental presumption of contemporary administrative law. Congress
has repeatedly legislated as to the standard of judicial review for agency
action. 16 1 For instance, the standards of judicial review in the Adminis161. The same presumption of Congress's constitutional authority also underlies a
host of specific statutes in which Congress has prescribed a standard of judicial review.
Barron and Kagan identify specific legislation in which the courts are directed to
determine interpretive questions "without unequal deference" to the agency's position.
See DavidJ. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev.
201, 216 n.58 (citing Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6714(e) (2000)). Elizabeth
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trative Procedure Act, 1 6 2 applied thousands of times in decisions reviewing agency action, rely on this presumption of congressional power, as
163
does the rule of deference of Chevron.
The most logical constitutional source for this power is one of the
most widely invoked structural provisions of the Constitution: the Necessary and Proper Clause. 164 Congress's provision of standards of review
for agency action-standards that allocate decisionmaking authority between the reviewing court and the agency-falls squarely within the traditional broad reading of the clause emanating from M'Culloch v.
1 65
Maryland.
Garrett provides examples of two statutes in which the Supreme Court has held that
Congress expressly delegated law interpretive functions to the agency. See Elizabeth
Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2637, 2642 n.19 (2003) (citing Batterton v.
Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977)) ("Congress in § 407(a) expressly delegated to the
Secretary the power to prescribe standards for determining what constitutes
'unemployment' for purposes of AFDC-UF eligibility. In a situation of this kind, Congress
entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for
interpreting the statutory term."); see also Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S.
607, 613-14 (1944) (concluding that term "as defined by the Administrator" constituted
delegation of primary interpretive power to Administrator).
162. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000).
163. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230, 236 (2001) (making
congressional choice to delegate power to bind with force of law necessary factor for
agency action to qualify for Chevron deference). But without the constitutional authority to
establish the standard for judicial review of agency action in the first place, Congress could
not make that choice. The Chevron doctrine, as specified by Mead, thus presumes that
Congress has power to prescribe the standard of judicial review for agency action.
164. The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to pass legislation
that "shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution ... all... Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Under this clause, called the Sweeping Clause by the
Framers, Congress is vested with the authority to make laws that are necessary and proper
for the implementation of powers granted by the Constitution to thejudicial (as well as the
executive) branch. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2130 (2004) [hereinafter
Merrill, Rethinking] (noting that Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to
make laws for "carrying into execution" powers vested in executive and judicial branches).
Because establishing the standards the judiciary employs in reviewing challenges to
administrative agency actions involves regulation of the judicial department, the Sweeping
Clause provides a sensible textual basis for this regulation. See Gary Lawson, Controlling
Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 Const. Comment.
191, 198 (2001) (concluding that it is "beyond cavil that the Sweeping Clause is the specific
textual vehicle for congressional legislation with respect to the operations of the judicial
department").
165. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 356 (1819). As is no doubt familiar, Chief Justice
Marshall gave the clause a broad construction to encompass all legislation that permits the
branches of government to effectively exercise their constitutional powers. "To make a law
constitutional," Chief Justice Marshall declared, "nothing more is necessary than that it
should be fairly adapted to carry into effect" a power of Congress or a "power[ ] expressly
given to the national government." Id. As John Harrison succinctly puts it, "Congress's
necessary and proper power is precisely the power to provide those rules that will enable
the other two branches to do their jobs more effectively." John Harrison, The Power of
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If Congress's authority to legislate for the beneficial execution of the
judicial power includes the power to establish standards of review for
agency action, then this power also should extend to review of the President's assertions of statutory power. The, power to set standards of judicial review for agency action is authority over the execution of the judicial
power. As a result, Congress's authority to set these standards does not
depend upon the type of statutory provision at issue or the identity of the
actor asserting statutory power. The Necessary and Proper Clause, for
instance, authorizes Congress to establish different standards for different types of decisions by agency actors. In each case, Congress sets the
framework for the federal courts' exercise of their power; the power to
establish that framework is not limited to particular types of statutory
questions presented. Accordingly, the fact that the construction of authority is the President's, as opposed to that of the head of a department
or an independent agency, does not limit Congress's power to prescribe
the use of the judicial power. Rather, on this view, the constitutional authority to set standards of judicial review for the President's assertions of
statutory power is merely an instance of the broader power to establish
the use of the federal courts in reviewing the exercise of delegated
166
discretion.
Even accepting Congress's power to establish standards of review for
agency action, the argument that this power in:ludes judicial review of
the President's statutory actions confronts a possible separation of powers
objection from the unitary executive position. Specifically, it might be
objected that allowing Congress to set the standard ofjudicial review for
the President's claims of statutory authority encroaches on the constitutional prerogatives of the President. 1 67 As noted above, defenders of a
Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke L.J. 503, 532-34 (2000) (defending
Congress's necessary and proper power to establish rules of precedent for federal courts).
The power of Congress to establish standards of judicial review for agency action is within
this traditional reading of the clause. A standard of judicial review allocates
decisionmaking authority between the reviewing court and the institution subject to
review. Thus, for instance, the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A), reflects a judgment that the primary responsibility
for a decision lies with the agency, and that federal courts are not to declare unlawful any
agency conclusion with which they disagree. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (noting that under arbitrary and capricious review
"[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency"). These
frameworks and standards for the use of the judicial power are instances, one might say, of
Congress's necessary and proper power "to insure, as far as human prudence could insure,
their beneficial execution." M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415.
166. The Necessary and Proper Clause may give Congress alone the authority to
establish powers incidental to executive or judicial powers expressly granted by the
Constitution. Van Alstyne, supra note 19, at 118.
167. Note that this objection is not an argument that Congress's power to set the
standard of review for the President's statutory actions infringes on the constitutional
powers of the judiciary. Whether or not there is an encroachment on the judicial power
does not depend on the identity of the actor for whom Congress has prescribed a standard
ofjudicial review. Some argue that allowing Congress the power to establish standards of
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strongly unitary conception of the executive argue that the Constitution
requires that the President control all power vested in the executive
branch, 16 8 and thus that the President have broad directive authority,
power to nullify an executive official's actions, and power to remove that
official at will. 169 But even this reading of the President's constitutional
powers does not require that courts grant the President's statutory constructions deference. The unitary theory allocates control within the executive branch; it does not entail a particular relationship between the
President and the courts.
To take the limiting case, there is no inconsistency between a unitary
theory of the executive and a congressional prescription of even a de
novo standard for judicial review of the President's assertions of statutory
authority. Under a de novo standard of review, courts would not take the
fact that the President had claimed that a statute authorized his action as
a reason to reach that same conclusion. 170 In that way, de novo review
may impose restrictions (or at least the Court's preferred construction)
on the scope of authority a statutory authorization grants. But judicial
review under that standard does not deny or impose a limit on the President's power to control the implementation of the law by lower-level officials. It does not address who within the executive branch is eligible to
assert statutory authority. Ajudicial standard of review does not itself involve any construction of the structure of authority within the executive
branch, and therefore71 even a de novo standard is consistent with the
strongly unitary view.'
review encroaches on the judicial power. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 164, at 223
(arguing that section 706 of APA and all organic statutes that establish judicial standards of
review for appeals from agency decisions are unconstitutional encroachments on judicial
power). But that view obviously rejects the starting premise that Congress can set the
standard of judicial review for agency action.
168. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 595.
169. Id. at 596-97.
170. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1362-63 (1997) (dtefining deference as taking
someone else's decision as reason to make same decision independent of merits of
decision).
171. A second line of separation-of-powers objections could come from a strain of
departmentalism. Defenders of departmentalism challenge the view that the executive
and legislative branches are bound to follow the Supreme Court's construction of the
Constitution. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial
Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Summer 2004, at 105, 106 (defining "departmentalism" as view that "recognizes the
authority of each federal branch department to interpret the Constitution
independently"). Michael Stokes Paulsen makes the further claim that the executive's
independent interpretive powers include not only the Constitution, but also federal law,
including statutes and treaties. Paulsen, supra note 160, at 222. It is this further claim of a
constitutional basis for interpretive authority over statutes from which this second line of
objection may arise. One implication of the view that the Constitution grants the President
interpretive authority as to statutes is that courts are required to grant the President's
statutory interpretations deference. The core justification for Paulsen's departmentalism is
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The President's constitutional prerogatives under Article II do not
undermine the view that Congress's power over the judiciary extends not
only to setting the standard of review of agency action, but also to review
of the President's constructions of delegated statutory power. 172 That
conclusion, of course, does not imply that Congress could never adopt a
standard of review that would be unconstitutional,1 73 only that Congress
has broad authority to legislate.
B. The Statutory Groundingof Chevron
If the Constitution does not require courts to grant deference to the
President's constructions of delegated statutory authority, then the question of the level of deference courts should accord the President's assertions of statutory authority becomes a matter of statutory interpretation
and policy. The Chevron doctrine provides the basic framework of judicial review for agency assertion of statutory authority. Presidential control over agency action poses deep and unavoidable questions for this
doctrine. To see why, it is useful to discuss briefly Chevron's basis.
Chevron established that a court must defer to an agency's reasonable
construction of an ambiguity or gap in a statute that the agency administers. 174 The Court expressed this standard in two steps. The first step is
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at isa concern that the concentration of interpretive power within a single institution upends
the checks and balances among the branches of government. See id. at 222, 228-29 ("The
power to interpret the law, including the Constitution, is . . . too important to vest in a
single set of hands."). But accepting Congress's power to set standards of review for the
President's assertions of statutory authority does not threaten the balance among the
branches or concentrate undue authority in "a single set of hands." On the contrary, it
allows for Congress's own policy choices to provide the basis for the manner in which the
courts exercise their interpretive authority, thereby making review of the President's
statutory powers a shared matter, with Congress establishing the standard and the courts
implementing it.
172. As noted above, supra note 121, the Court has held that the APA does not apply
to the President. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992). The Court
reached this conclusion based on a clear statement rule-the Court would not construe
the APA to apply to the President absent a clear statement of Congress's intention for it to
do so. See id. at 801.
173. There may be some standard of review-perhaps a per se presumption against
the legality of executive acts-that would violate separation-of-powers principles. But even
though there is some limit to Congress's power, the basic point remains that Congress has
broad authority to establish the standard of review, including the presumptions defended
in Parts III and IV. In this way, the constitutional status of the standards for judicial review
of the President's statutory powers is an amalgam of the useful categories proposed by
Nicholas Rosenkranz. They are closest to what Rosenkranz calls a constitutional startingpoint rule: Congress may change such rules, though sometimes only within "immutable
parameters" established by the Constitution. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of
Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2093, 2097 (2002).
174. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
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sue."' 75 If the intent of Congress on the particular interpretive question
at issue is "clear," then that intention governs. 176 If the statute's requirements are ambiguous, or the statute is silent on the specific issue, the
court takes the second step. It does not simply "impose" its own interpretation of the statute (as it would in the absence of an administrative construction); rather, it must accept the agency's interpretation of the statute
77
as long as it is "permissible." 1
This two-part test establishes a framework of review that is starkly different from the tools that a court traditionally uses when interpreting a
statute. The Chevron framework does not direct the court to determine
the meaning of ambiguities in a statute; rather, it allocates that interpretive task to the agency. Where there is statutory ambiguity (or silence),
78
the court is to defer to the agency's legal interpretation of the statute1
as reflected in its rulemaking or adjudication.
The Chevron Court justified this shift of interpretive authority from
the courts to agencies on two basic grounds. First, it noted that "U]udges
are not experts in the field." 179 Thus where Congress has not specifically
decided an issue, it makes sense for generalist federal judges to defer to
the agency's choice. Second, the Court noted that agencies are more
politically accountable than federal judges. 8 0 Because agencies do not
themselves have an electoral constituency, their accountability and connection to the views of the incumbent administration depends upon presidential control. Consistent with the basic contrast between agencies and
federal judges in the Chevron opinion itself, subsequent to Chevron the
Court has required only that agencies be subject to greater presidential
control than is the federal judiciary for Chevron to apply. For instance,
the Court routinely applies Chevron deference to the actions of independent agencies. 18 ' In addition, as noted above, agencies are eligible for
Chevron deference only for interpretations of statutes that the agency it182
self "administers."
175. Id. at 842.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 843.
178. This deference is subject, of course, to the further requirements of eligibility
discussed in the next several paragraphs.
179. 467 U.S. at 865.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 523 (2002) (applying Chevron
deference to challenge to FCC rules); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387
(1999) (same).
182. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (stating that Chevron's two-step analysis applies "[w]hen
a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers"); see also id. at
843 ("'The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created ...
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy.'" (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415
U.S. 199, 231 (1974))); id. at 844 ("We have long recognized that considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer."); id. at 865-66 (noting that deference applies to agency
construction of gaps or ambiguities in statute left to be "resolved by the agency charged
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United States v. Mead Corp. clarified that the basis for Chevron's application is congressional delegation of interpretive authority.'l 3 The specific question in Mead was whether a tariff-ruling letter issued by one of
the Customs Service's regional offices was entitled to Chevron deference. 18 4 The Court held that agency action would qualify for Chevron
deference only if it satisfied two steps: First, Congress must have "delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force
of law," and second, the agency must have acted pursuant to that authority.185 Because Congress did not delegate to the Customs Service that
authority, and the Customs Service failed to act with a lawmaking pretense, its action did not qualify for Chevron deference.'8 6 Mead thus specified that, for Chevron to apply, the agency must not only "administer" a
statute, but also use authority granted it by Congress to bind with the
force of law.
C. PresidentialControl and Chevron Deference
A President's assertion of control over agency action poses complex
problems for the Chevron doctrine. On the one hand, Chevron's political
accountability rationale would support finding that any agency action
taken pursuant to the President's direction is eligible for Chevron deference. On the other hand, the agency-administration requirement suggests that if a statute delegates authority to the agency, and does not mention the President, then the agency, not the President, is the body courts
should presume is eligible for Chevron deference under the statute.
Kagan defends the former view. She argues that courts should apply
Chevron to agency action only when such action was the product of the
President's involvement.18 7 Kagan thus casts aside the limitation that
Chevron applies only to an agency's interpretation of a statute that the
agency itself "administers."' 8 8 If the basis for Chevron deference is the
President's control or direction of agency action, it makes little sense to
restrict Chevron's application to an agency's interpretations to only the
specific set of statutes the agency "administers." Presidential influence
could be the basis for an agency's construction of virtually any statute that
delegates power, not only the specific statutes that delegate authority to a
given agency. If the application of Chevron deference is a function of
presidential control, then it should not matter whether the statute the
agency interprets is one that the agency administers, as long as the interwith the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities"); supra notes 126-133
and accompanying text (discussing Chevron's limitation to agency-administered statutes).
183. 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
184. Id. at 221, 224.
185. Id. at 226-27.
186. Id. at 231-34.
187. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2377-78.
188. Kagan notes that if delegation is the basis for deference, then making deference
a function of the President's control makes no sense. See id. at 2378.
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pretation stems from presidential direction. Instead of the agency-administration requirement, Kagan ends up with the view that the President
effectively "administers" all statutes granting authority to executive
branch officials in the sense that it is the President's exercise of discretion
that is eligible for Chevron deference.
But if, as Part II argues, the President can claim directive authority
under statutes only when the statutes grant authority to the President in
name, then the President's directions could only be eligible for Chevron
deference under the same conditions. The reason is straightforward: Directive authority is a necessary condition for Chevron deference.' 89 As a
result, the set of statutes under which the President's directions are eligible for Chevron deference can be no larger than those statutes under
which the President has such authority. Interpretive deference under
Chevron requires a grant of directive authority.
This reasoning implies that an agency action could lose Chevron deference if it were taken purs'aant to a presidential directive where the statutory delegation runs to the agency. Identifying those instances would
not be easy. 190 Most agencies will not declare that their action is founded
on an executive directive, but rather rationalize the decision in terms of
statutory criteria. 9 1 But the difficulty of identification does not defeat
the need for clarification of the background norm. The agency's rationalization of its action in terms of statutory criteria is not merely a prudent
course of action when confronted with a presidential directive: The presidential direction is not a sufficient basis for action where the statute runs
to the agency, and therefore, an action taken on the basis of presidential
direction alone could not be eligible for judicial deference. That norm,
if valid, should apply to executive branch statutory interpretation as well.
Moreover, even though the motive behind agency action will often be
opaque, this limitation on the application of Chevron deference provides

189. Cf. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) ("A precondition to
deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority.").
190. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 25-26 (noting difficulty of practical
enforcement of distinction between presidential influence and command).
191. The Supreme Court's decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 463 U.S. 29 (1983), is .- common contemporary
shorthand for the requirement that agencies rationalize their decisions in terms of
statutory criteria, and that a change of administration is not a sufficient basis for agency
action (at least when the delegation runs to the agency). In State Farm, the Court found
the National Highway Traffic Safety Agency's decision to rescind a rule requiring passiverestraint seat belts was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 34. The rescission followed a change
in presidential administration. Despite that fact, the Court required that the official's
decision must be rationalized and justified with reference to the statute and the facts. Id.
at 48; see also Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 226-27
(1990) (describing State Farm as establishing that political directions are inadequate to
justify regulatory policy).
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further reason and incentive for agency officials to ensure that they exer92
cise their own independent discretion. 1
Revisiting the question of the scope of the President's statutory powers thus clarifies the circumstances under which an executive official or
the President satisfies a necessary condition for Chevron's application.
This position suggests that the structural guarantees of presidential influence over agency action-appointment to limited terms, at will or for
cause removal powers, ex parte communications-are sufficient to satisfy
Chevron's demands that agencies be more politically accountable than
courts, 19 3 but still insists on the distinction between these structures of
influence and directive authority.
D. The Statutes the President "Administers"
This focus on Congress's express choice of delegate suggests not only
a limitation of Chevron's application to agency action, but also grounds
for extending Chevron to the President's own assertions of statutory authority that follow from express delegations. Of course, merely because
the President has authority under a statute does not imply that the President's actions under it should receive Chevron deference. Authority is a
necessary condition for deference, but it may not be a sufficient condition. But, as I have argued elsewhere, 19 4 there are strong reasons to grant
Chevron deference when the President acts under an express statutory
delegation.
The Supreme Court's decision in Mead Corp. makes clear that an
agency may be eligible for Chevron deference even when Congress did not
require that it follow procedural formalities, such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 19 5 Delegations to the President rarely require any such formalities, especially not something as formal as notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 196 But when Congress has expressly delegated authority to
the President, basic political values of accountability and coordination
counsel in favor of applying (or presuming a congressional intent to ap192. This position helps to reveal the connection between Chevron's scope of
application and the practical principle that emerged from the Supreme Court's decision in
State Farm. State Farm establishes that political influence alone is not a sufficient
rationalization for agency action. See 463 U.S. at 34. The argument here shows that
principle holds at least when the statutory delegation runs to the agency. Whether the
presidential action would require rationalization, even in the absence of the application of
statutory requirements, like the APA, is another matter.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 136-139 (discussing President's means of
influence over agency policy even without broad directive authority).
194. See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 539, 585-99 (2005)
(arguing that Chevron should apply to President's direct assertions of statutory authority
without providing account of range of statutes President "administers").
195. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227, 230-31 (2001); see also Nat'l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., No. 04-277, slip. op. at 1-2 (U.S.
June 27, 2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that under Mead formal process is neither
necessary nor sufficient for Chevron deference).
196. See Stack, supra note 194, at 552-53.
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ply) Chevron deference. 19 7 Presidential directives are, by and large,
highly visible and make clear who is responsible for the policies they embody.""' The President is also uniquely positioned to coordinate the interpretations of a variety of agency actors. 199 Moreover, if the agencies
are entitled to a presumption of a congressional intent to grant their interpretations deference in part because of their connection to the Chief
Executive, then the Chief Executive acting on his own pursuant to an
express statutory delegation should qualify for such deference.
The Court in Chevron also justified deference based on the administrative agency's "great[er] expertise" in the field of regulation. 20 0 Presidents are generalists. But presidents' position at the apex of administration puts them in a good position to demand the expertise of executive
branch officers. Even if we concede that the President may have less expertise than an agency-although how much is not clear-that deficit
does not unseat the strong grounds for applying Chevron to presidential
orders based on the President's heightened accountability, visibility, and
ability to coordinate policy 2°1 where Congress has expressly delegated authority to the President, either alone or in a mixed agency-President delegation. 20 2 Express delegations of authority to the President thus are a
necessary but also a sufficient condition for the President's actions to be
eligible for Chevron deference. Attention to the scope of the President's
statutory powers thus supplies an account of the statutes the President
"administers" in the sense of being the official whose exercise of direction
warrants a presumption of interpretive deference.

197. See id. at 588-99. The fact that the President occupies a national office does not
necessarily imply the President will act based on less parochial incentives than members of
the legislature. See Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and
the Perils of Occam's Razor, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 109, 125-31 (2000) (criticizing uncritical
reliance on assumption that because President faces a national election the President has
electoral incentives to be more public-regarding and less parochial than legislature); Jide
Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2006) (illustrating prospect for parochial election incentives of
President within Electoral College).
198. See Stack, supra note 194, at 588-99.
199. See Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation,
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 219, 255-56 (1993) [hereinafter Herz, Imposing] (commenting on
President's ability to coordinate policy).
200. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
201. Stack, supra note 194, at 590-92 (suggesting grounds for applying Chevron to
President).
202. This suggestion is further supported by court decisions that treat as the
"administering agency" for Chevron purposes those agencies to whom the President has
subdelegated authority expressly delegated to him by Congress. See, e.g., Wagner Seed
Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 920-21 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (granting Chevron deference to EPA
Administrator as "administering agency" despite fact that Administrator's authority
stemmed from subdelegation of powers granted to President). If the President did not
qualify as "administering" the statute, then neither should the President's subdelegate.
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The more general principle here is that only actions by express recipients of statutory authority are eligible for Chevron deference. 20 3 This
account takes the scope ofjudicial deference to the President's claims of
statutory authority to be within Congress's control, and emphasizes that
Congress's choice of delegate is central to triggering that deference.
Such an approach helps resist the temptations of courts to imply incidental presidential powers under broadly deferential standards that are not
grounded in statute. And, as the next Part addresses, it also builds checks
into the structure of the executive branch's implementation of statutory
powers.
IV.

THE PRESIDENT'S STATUTORY

POWERS

OVER THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

This account of the scope of the President's statutory powers and
according eligibility for judicial deference under Chevron has several implications for the allocation of decisionmaking authority within the executive branch. These implications apply, of course, only so long as statu20 4
tory grants of power to agency officials are constitutionally permissible.
A. Statutory Interpretation Within the Executive Branch
The most visible consequence for executive branch officers is that
final decisionmaking authority should flow to statutory delegates. It
should do so for at least two reasons. First, it is a widely shared principle
of public administration that executive branch and agency officials prefer
(other things being equal) for their actions to receive greaterjudicial deference. As a result, if only the actions of express recipients of statutory
authority may be eligible for Chevron deference, executive branch actors
have strong incentives to allocate final decisionmaking authority to those
officials whether they be the President or the agency. 20 5 If a President
203. This argument suggests that a more general principle underlies the position
proposed by Barron and Kagan that the acts of statutory delegates, and not lower-level
agency actors, should be eligible for Chevron deference. See Barron & Kagan, supra note
161, at 235-36. If the argument here is valid, it suggests that Barron and Kagan's
conclusion is one instance of a more general principle that only the actions of statutory
delegates are eligible for Chevron. Thus neither lower-level officials nor the President may
stand in the place of an agency official who was delegated authority (or rather, when they
do so, eligibility for Chevron deference is lost).
204. For some defenders of a strongly unitary conception of the executive, as noted
above, all executive authority must be vested in the President. See Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 9, at 594-96. That position, as suggested in Part I, may imply that, on their
constitutional premises, delegations to executive officials are unconstitutional. But
because our current legal framework relies heavily upon the constitutionality of
delegations to executive and other officials, it makes sense to consider the application of
these conclusions for statutory interpretation within the executive branch without
assuming the correctness of the constitutional commitments of the strongly unitary view of
the executive.
205. Michael Herz examines the analogous proposition that "ultimate interpretive
authority within the executive branch should lie with whatever person or agency to which
the courts would defer on judicial review." Herz, Imposing, supra note 199, at 257. "Such
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were to substitute his judgment for that of the statutory delegate, his act
would forfeit judicial deference to the agency's action.
Second, even in cases where judicial review of the agency's action is
unavailable or unlikely, the underlying limitation on the scope of the
President's directive authority remains. Absent an independent or autonomous constitutional power, 20 6 executive orders or presidential directives
may bind agency officials only when they follow from an express delegation to the President. The ultimate legal discretion lies with the express
statutory delegate-the official to whom Congress has conferred authority and who has an independent legal duty to exercise that authority.
This framework provides guidance to executive officers who are confronted with presidential orders. Consider the following two examples of
assertions of directive authority. First, in a memorandum addressed to
the Secretaries of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Treasury,
President Clinton explained that food safety was a high priority, and that
20 7
further efforts were required to insure the safety of imported food.
President Clinton specifically "direct[ed]" these Secretaries "to take all
actions available to... [p] rohibit the reimportation of food that has been
previously refused admission ... (so called 'port shopping'), and require
the marking of shipping containers and/or papers of imported food that
'20 8
is refused admission for safety reasons.
Statutory authority to refuse the importation of food is delegated to
the Secretaries of HHS and the Treasury, 20 9 and the authority to promul210
gate rules to carry out this provision is granted to the same Secretaries.
These delegations make no mention of the President. The Surgeon General, subject to the approval of the Secretary of HHS, is delegated authoran approach increases the chances that the interpretation will be upheld on judicial
review." Id. My suggestion is that courts should defer to the actions of agents to whom
authority is delegated-the agents to whom the statute creates a duty to act-and as a
result, so should intra-executive branch actors. Cf. Energy W. Mining Safety Co. v. Fed.
Mine Safety & Health Comm'n, 40 F.3d 457, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that
Commission owes Secretary, as statutory delegate, same deference that court owes
Secretary).
206. H. Jefferson Powell suggests the useful terminology of "independent" and
autonomous" powers. Powell, President's Authority, supra note 2, at 543-44.
"Autonomous" powers are those the Constitution grants the President exclusively and
limits Congress's power to control. Id. "Independent" powers are powers to act without
congressional authorization but subject to congressional regulation. Id. I refer to cases in
which the President lacks both independent and autonomous powers.
207. Memorandum on the Safety of Imported Foods, 2 Pub. Papers 1129 (July 3,
1999).
208. Id. at 1130. Several months later the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
which is part of HHS, issued proposed regulations to require markings on containers of
food that had been refused entry at a U.S. port. Marking Requirements for and
Prohibition on the Reimportation of Imported Food Products that Have Been Refused
Admission into the United States, 66 Fed. Reg. 6502, 6502-03 (proposedJan. 22, 2001) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.1).
209. See 21 U.S.C. § 381(a) (2000).
210. See id. § 371(b).
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ity to make regulations necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases. 2 11 Although the President is
granted authority to detain individuals upon recommendations from the
National Advisory Health Council and in consultation with the Surgeon
General, the statute does not grant the President the authority to regulate
the importation of goods for health purposes. 212 Thus, President Clinton's directive to the Secretaries to "require" marking of containers of
imported food did not have a basis in an express statutory delegation to
the President and, as a result, would not legally bind the Secretaries-and
their actions taken based on his directions would not qualify for Chevron
deference.
In contrast, where the President is expressly granted power under a
statute, he has legal authority to bind the exercise of discretion of lowerlevel officials, as well as the public. For instance, under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, the President is expressly
granted power to "prescribe such policies and directives, not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act, as he shall deem necessary to effectuate
the provisions of said Act."2 13 Pursuant to this express grant of power,
President George W. Bush issued an executive order requiring that government contractors post a notice regarding the right of workers not to
participate in a union. 2 14 The order specified that it was to be enforced
by the Secretary of Labor. 215 In view of the President's express statutory
delegation of authority, the Secretary of Labor has a legal duty to comply
with the President's executive order, regardless of whether she believes it
to be the best construction of the Act. Outside a command that exceeds
the scope of power granted to the President, the Secretary's duty is to
comply; likewise, a court should grant Chevron deference to the President's construction of an express delegation of statutory power.
B. Agency Statutory Interpretation: The Force of Executive Orders
If, absent independent constitutional authorization, an executive order is legally binding on agency officials only when the President is expressly authorized by statute to act, the next question is how an agency
211. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2000).
212. See id. § 264(b). The other sources of statutory authority that the FDA
referenced in its proposed rules also did not delegate any authority to the President in
name. See 21 U.S.C. § 334 (describing grounds and procedures for seizure of adulterated
or misbranded goods); id. § 342 (defining adulterated food and granting Secretary
enforcement and rulemaking authority); id. § 344(a) (providing Secretary authority to
grant permits for food manufacture as health protection measure); id. § 374(a) (granting
Secretary right to enter premises in which food is manufactured); 42 U.S.C. § 241
(granting Secretary authority to investigate causes of disease); cf. 66 Fed. Reg. at 6503,
6505 (invoking these sources of statutory authority in addition to 21 U.S.C. §§ 371, 381).
213. 40 U.S.C. § 486(a) (2000) (current version at 40 U.S.C.A. § 121 (West 2005)).
214. Exec. Order No. 13,201, § 2(a)(1), 3 C.F.R. 754, 755 (2001), reprinted in 41
U.S.C.A. § 254 (West Supp. 2005).
215. See id. § I(b).

HeinOnline -- 106 Colum. L. Rev. 312 2006

2006]

THE PRESIDENT'S STATUTORY POWERS

official who is granted authority under a statute should regard a presidential order relating to the exercise of the official's discretion. What legal
obligations does President Clinton's port shopping order impose on the
Secretaries of HHS and the Treasury? It seems worth sketching out some
considerations to inform this inquiry.
The question of how an agency should treat such an executive order
depends in part upon how agency officials should engage in statutory
interpretation. As several scholars recently have emphasized, the institutional position of executive branch actors is distinct from that of courts,
and, as a result, statutory interpretation within the executive branch calls
for its own theory, including consideration of the weight of presidential
directives. 2 16 In a provocative article charting out the basic contours of
this terrain, Jerry Mashaw suggests that agency statutory interpreters
should follow presidential directions unless they are clearly outside the
agent's authority, whereas the same deference to presidential constructions does not apply to judicial interpretation. 2 17 Mashaw writes that
"[a] gency recalcitrance in the face of a valid executive order is neither
2 18
politically prudent nor constitutionally appropriate."
One could easily assent to that position-with a caveat that goes to
the central aims of this Article. This Article aims to give an account of
the scope of validity-in the sense of legal bindingness-of executive orders or other presidential directives that lack independent or autonomous constitutional authorization. In short, it argues that an express stat216. See, e.g., Mashaw, Norms, supra note 158, at 506-24 (suggesting structural and
prudential differences between how agencies and courts justify development of conception
of agency statutory interpretation as autonomous enterprise); Peter L. Strauss, When the
Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and
the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 321, 329-35 (1990) (examining
differences between use of legislative history by courts and agencies); see also Herz,
Imposing, supra note 199, at 252-71 (illustrating complex institutional interaction
between executive branch actors over questions of statutory interpretation). See generally
Morrison, supra note 158 (examining application of avoidance doctrine in executive
branch statutory interpretation).
217. Mashaw, Norms, supra note 158, at 522. Mashaw notes that agencies, unlike
courts, are not passive interpreters. They do not depend on adversaries to generate
occasions for statutory interpretation, but rather "are expected to pick and choose their
occasions for interpretation and the forms those interpretive utterances will take." Id. at
513. He suggests, among other things, that this agenda control cuts in favor of modes of
statutory interpretation that embrace a wider set of policy considerations and pay more
attention to political context than is constitutionally appropriate for courts. Id. Likewise,
agency statutory interpreters are differently situated than courts with regard to the
Constitution. If agency interpreters were to employ the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance in their own statutory interpretations, that might both impede their capacity to
carry out their legislative mandates effectively as well as "usurp[ I the role of the judiciary
in harmonizing congressional power and constitutional command." Id. at 508. Similarly,
even when it is the agency, not the President, that is the recipient of statutory authority, a
President's order to the agency may bear different weight in the agency's interpretive
exercise than it would for a court.
218. Id. at 506.
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utory delegation to the President is required in order to bind an agency
to comply with a presidential directive. Agency recalcitrance in the face
of executive orders that stem from express delegations would indeed be
constitutionally inappropriate.
But how should an executive official regard an executive order that
falls outside of that range of express delegation? Such presidential directives are of course relevant practically to the official because the President
has the power to remove the official (or threaten removal). But the directive's relevance extends beyond those prudential considerations. To
see this, consider an official who simply ignored the President's executive
order. That official has done more than risk shortening his or her tenure. Rather, at the minimum, the official seems to have violated an obligation to carefully consider the President's position.
This apparent obligation to consider the President's position suggests a starting point for a model of the manner in which agency actors
should evaluate presidential orders: the canonical standard for court review of agency action set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 219 In Skidmore,
the Court was asked to decide whether overnight stays in a company fire
hall to respond to alarms could constitute working time under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.2 20 In the course of remanding the case back to the
district court, the Supreme Court articulated a standard for the level of
deference courts should accord the views of the Administrator as expressed in interpretative bulletins and informal rulings. The Court held
that the Administrator's views, while not controlling upon the courts,
were entitled to careful consideration: "The weight of such a judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 22 1 Indeed, in Skidmore, the Court suggested that the agency's and the court's views should diverge only for
"very good reasons. ' 222
Several formal features of the broad Skidmore standard could provide
a baseline for agency consideration of the presidential directives that do
not legally bind the agency's discretion. Despite the flexibility of the Skidmore standard, it does impose an obligation on the reviewing court to
consider the agency's position and its basis. At the least, an obligation of
consideration of the President's position and its grounds should apply to
agency officials. But Skidmore demands more than that. In the context of
judicial review of agency action, it creates a rebuttable presumption in
219. 323 U.S. 134 (1944); cf. Herz, Imposing, supra note 199, at 258 (proposing
inverse standard under which Skidmore agency expertise rationale rather than Chevron-like
emphasis upon accountability through proximity to President would govern judicial
deference to agency discretion).
220. 323 U.S. at 135.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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favor of the agency's position. So too agency actors should adopt a rebuttable presumption in favor of the President's preferred statutory constructions such that their views will diverge from the President's only for
"very good reasons."
Within this basic framework, the range of considerations that inform
the strength of this presumption and when it will be rebutted are likely to
be different from those that would lead a court to uphold an agency's
action under Skidmore. For instance, one could imagine that if the President's order pertains to the coordination of policy among different agencies-something the President is particularly well positioned to do-it
may warrant more substantial weight, and thus increase the burden on
the agency official seeking to overcome it. Likewise, if the order reflects
an issue or policy that had played a role in the President's campaign, or
that the President has publicly embraced, it may merit added significance. 223 In contrast, the consistency of the President's position with
prior pronouncements would have less weight than consistency might in
the context of judicial review of agency action. A framework for agency
consideration of executive orders based on a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the President's view would require the agency to give serious consideration to the President's directives, but the ultimate judgment about
whether to follow the President's position would rest with the agency
officials.
In response to this framework, one might object that it would encourage the President to communicate his policies to agencies informally,
resulting in less government transparency. In other words, the conclusion that the President's orders are not legally binding on agency officials
unless the statute grants express powers to the President will reduce the
incentives for presidents to act in ways that allow the public to learn the
specific presidential policy behind the agency's actions.
There are several levels of response to this objection. First, the extent to which this framework would decrease the incentives for transparency is not clear. There are already strong incentives for the President to achieve his political platform informally through officers of the
administration, and then claim credit for those actions if there are potential sources for political gain.2 24 It is also already extraordinarily difficult
to distinguish between an agency's motivating reason for action (say, the
suggestion of the President or White House staff) and the reasons that
223. See Herz, Imposing, supra note 199, at 259, 262-64 (suggesting reasons why
presidential involvement should enhance judicial deference to agency actions); see also
supra note 192.
224. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2299-303 (describing President Clinton's practices of
announcing administrative work product as well as exerting influence on agency officials
in anticipation of presidential announcements of their actions); Strauss, Presidential
Rulemaking, supra note 45, at 965-67 (describing President Clinton's public claims of
ownership of agency rulemakings where rulemaking documents themselves give no
indication of presidential involvement).
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the agency invokes to justify its action. 2 25 Second, even if transparency
may suffer, the cause of good policymaking may be advanced precisely
because informal give-and-take between the agency and the President
may cause both to rethink their initial policy positions without the political consequences of a public negotiation. Further, this view also reinforces the agency's incentives tojustify its action in terms of statutory criteria even in the presence of a presidential position, and perhaps
especially then. From the perspective of producing public-regarding reg22 6
ulation, that reinforcement might be applauded.
More generally, this construction of the President's statutory powers
results in a conception of the executive branch in which Congress, by
vesting authority in an official alone, creates a potential source of temporary resistance to the President. Despite the enormous influence the
President has over executive officials, the official could disagree with a
President's preferred construction or use of the statute. Certainly any
executive official's resistance to presidential policy is likely to be at most
temporary-firing and replacement is always a possibility. But the mere
possibility of resistance creates a legal check on presidential abuse internal to the executive branch: The President must persuade or fire the
official, rather than simply bind that official to his views. As the next Part
argues, we have reasons to embrace this allocation of independent discretion to agency officials.
V.

PRESIDENTIAL EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE CHOICE OF DELEGATE

Every time Congress seeks to grant authority, it must make a structural choice about institutional design. It must determine to whom to
grant power, what organizational structure to create, what administrative
processes to require, and how the recipients of statutory authority may be
removed. These structural choices are themselves a product of politics,
"for all political actors know that structure is the means by which policies
are carried out or subverted, and that different structures can have enormously different consequences. "227
225. See, e.g., Herz, Imposing, supra note 199, at 229-48 (illustrating executive
branch interaction, and back-and-forth, over issuing EPA Rule); Mashaw, Norms, supra
note 158, at 505 (noting it is not good argument for agencies to defend their regulations
on ground that President "told me to interpret the statute that way").
226. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 528 n.313 (2003) (describing how
requirement of agency rationality tends to "inhibit decisions that evince an impermissibly
narrow purpose or fail to evince a properly public purpose").
227. Terry M. Moe & Michael Caldwell, The Institutional Foundations of Democratic
Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems, 150J. Institutional
& Theoretical Econ. 171, 173 (1994); see also Lewis, supra note 3, at 2-3 (2003) (arguing
that agency design is shaped less by concerns about efficiency and effectiveness than
concerns about reelection, political control, and policy outcomes); Moe, Bureaucratic
Structure, supra note 122, at 267 (arguing that American public bureaucracy "is not
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Those political choices require a default rule as to how delegations
to officials are construed, including to whom they grant directive authority. The statutory arguments presented in the previous Parts furnish one
such default rule of construction: They provide a clear interpretive presumption as a basis for congressional, judicial, and executive branch actions. They also track Congress's vocabulary of delegation. But are these
constructions desirable? This Part briefly suggests how presidential and
congressional actors might respond to that question, and then provides
the outline of a broader defense of the desirability of these constructions.
Contemporary empirical work provides grounds to suggest that the
President and Congress are likely to view these statutory constructions
differently. Presidents, this empirical work shows, are under strong political pressures to control the administrative state; they are broadly held
accountable for the functioning of government, and they need centralized control to implement policy effectively. 228 As a result, modern presidents have opposed "agency designs that will limit their control or confuse lines of accountability. ''2 29 Based on this general premise, the
emphasis on express delegation as a requirement for directive authority
would result in less clear control of bureaucracy for presidents; it does
not make presidents institutional winners.
Congress's interests in structural design are, in contrast, more diffuse
and contingent. 230 Individual members of Congress have fewer incentives than presidents to create an effective or centrally controlled bureaucracy. Their reelection prospects are tied to serving the particular interests of their constituents and organized interest groups. Sometimes those
interests are furthered by presidential control of policymaking. 2 31 But
when the President is unlikely to support the policy created, members of
Congress will seek to "insulate as much as possible from presidential control." 2 3 2 In conditions of uncertainty, Congress deploys a wide variety of
tools of insulation, from requiring that the agency officials be appointed
for fixed terms through a commission structure, to locating them in executive departments and imposing procedural requirements on their actions. 233 Based on the premise that Congress has an interest in being
able to create varying degrees of presidential control over agency actors,
Congress's own interest is advanced if simple delegations to executive officials are not extended by implication to include the President, especially
designed to be effective"; rather, it arises "out of politics, and its design reflects the interest,
strategies, and compromises of those who exercise political power").
228. Lewis, supra note 3, at 24-27 (describing President's incentives to control
bureaucracy).
229. Id. at 26.
230. See Moe, Bureaucratic Structure, supra note 122, at 277-79.
231. Lewis, supra note 3, at 28-29, 37.
232. Id. at 30.
233. Id. at 30-38 (providing detailed analysis of Congress's tools of insulating
agencies from presidential oversight).
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when formulations to achieve those purposes, such as mixed agency-President delegations or President-only delegations, are readily available.
Permitting the President to assert implied authority under a delegation to an executive official would short-circuit the administrative process
that Congress typically specifies for agency actors. Agency process has
been a persistent source of legitimacy for administrative action. And
since the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, unless the organic statute otherwise provides, executive agencies must comply with the
APA's procedural requirements. 2 34 The APA does not, as noted, apply to
the President. 235 Therefore, if the President were permitted to act directly under a statutory delegation, say, by promulgating standards of
workplace safety in his own name, the implementation of the delegated
powers would fall outside the procedural requirements of the APA, despite the applicability of those requirements to actions by the express
delegate.2 3 6 In this way, statutory constructions that imply directive powers disrupt Congress's interest in specifying the procedures through
2 37
which statutory delegations should be implemented.
The central normative argument for implying statutory powers to the
President is that the President's political accountability is an important
source of legitimacy for the administrative state, 238 and the President's
general control over agency action promotes responsiveness and effi234. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-584 (2000).
235. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992).
236. While the APA would apply to an agency actor implementing a President's
directive, see Stack, supra note 194, at 555; supra note 121, in this circumstance the
President acts under the statute in his own name.
237. Reading delegations in this way corresponds to recent interpretations of the
scope of Congress's power to delegate. Merrill argues in a recent article that Article I,
Section I of the Constitution does not prohibit Congress from delegating legislative
power-that is, it does not embody what has traditionally been called the nondelegation
doctrine-but it does require that delegations of lawmaking authority must come from
Congress, which he calls the exclusive delegation doctrine. See Merrill, Rethinking, supra
note 164, at 2100-01. Merrill argues that one consequence of this exclusive delegation
doctrine is that "[riesponsibility for the exercise of the delegated power must rest where
Congress has placed it," unless Congress has authorized its delegates to subdelegate. Id. at
2176. This constitutional conclusion leaves open the statutory interpretation question of
how to tell where Congress has placed authority. The substantive statutory interpretations
defended above provide a partial answer: The President cannot supplant Congress's
express determination of the agent to whom it delegates authority. Abiding by Congress's
express choice of delegate supports the underlying values served by the exclusive
delegation doctrine. Among other things, it reinforces Congress's political accountability
for its choice of delegate, see id. at 2142, as well as provides an easily administrable
standard ofjudicial review, see id. at 2150.
238. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2331-46. But see Bressman, supra note 226, at 463
(arguing that presidential accountability is not sufficient to legitimate administrative state);
Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex
World, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 987, 988 (1997) (critiquing reliance on presidential
accountability as simple answer to problem of legitimacy of administrative state).
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ciency of bureaucracy. 23 9 But those values can be adequately protected
without the potential costs invited by use of implied constructions.
Presidents have a wide and effective variety of tools for influencing
the behavior of executive agencies. 240 As noted above, empirical work
supports the intuition that as a result of the President's ability to influence agency behavior, there is a strong correspondence between presidential priorities and executive agency policy. 24' Indeed, that correspon242
If
dence is also reflected in policies of independent agencies.
executive agencies closely track presidential priorities, and the President's own political pressures provide strong incentives to make executive
agencies effective, taking the additional step of implying presidential directive authority is not necessary to create sufficient political responsiveness and accountability in administrative agencies. Political accountability need not be maximized to be effective. Denying the President's
implied statutory powers leaves in place conventional tools of presidential
control, such as appointment and removal, 243 that already ensure the loyalty, if not total obedience, of executive officials.
Other structural considerations provide additional grounds for resisting the further step of implying directive authority for the President in
delegations to executive officials. Presidents have several institutional advantages over Congress; these advantages provide reasons to adopt narrow constructions of the President's statutory powers. As public choice
theory shows, the transaction costs of congressional action are much
higher than those the President faces in asserting power in a presidential
order. 244 To act, Congress must coordinate and negotiate with hundreds
of members, "each with their own constituencies, interests, and schedules." 24 5 In contrast, the President may act on his own initiative in the
virtual absence of procedure 246 and without any need to obtain agreement from others. 247 That allows the President to gain a "first mover"
advantage; the President can implement policy on his own and force
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 8, at 2339-46.
See supra text accompanying notes 136-139.
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 135-147.

244. See, e.g., William G. Howell, Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct
Presidential Action 14-16 (2003) (noting that "the president acts alone" without "need to
rally majorities, compromise with adversaries, or wait for some interest group to bring a
case to court"); Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral
Action, 15J.L. Econ. & Org. 132, 144-45 (1999) (explaining ways in which Congress faces
greater collective action problems than President).
245. Howell, supra note 244, at 107.
246. See Stack, supra note 194, at 552-53 (discussing dearth of enforceable
procedural requirements for issuance of executive orders).
247. See Howell, supra note 244, at 107 (noting that, unlike Congress, President is
"free to set policy on his own").
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other institutions to respond to his agenda and policy. 248 If other institutions "are unable to respond effectively, or decide not to, presidents win
by default. '24 9 The President's position as an executive in the federal
bureaucracy also grants him a strategic advantage in gaining access to
250
expertise and information.
The President also has greater incentives to expand his power than
members of Congress have to constrict it. Based on the modest assumption that members of Congress generally aim to gain reelection, they focus their efforts on legislation that may benefit their constituents. 2 51 The
institutional consequences of permitting a President to assert implied
statutory authority are not likely to be of great importance to legislative
constituencies-or are likely to be important only if they correspond to a
particular policy impact. Presidents, in contrast, represent a national
constituency, and "are held accountable for their performance as managers." 25 2 As a result, presidents have greater interest in protecting and
expanding their institutional power than do members of Congress on behalf of their institution. Members of Congress, as Terry Moe observes,
"are unlikely to oppose incremental increases in the relative power of
presidents unless the issue in question directly harms the special interests
of their constituents-which, if presidents play their cards right, can
often be avoided.12 5 3 Defending Congress's institutional power also
tends to require centralized and bipartisan cooperation and less member
autonomy, which is also unattractive and costly to members of Congress. 2 54 Finally, legislation to overrule executive actions approved by a
sitting President will often require a veto-proof supermajority. Recent
248. See id. at 15, 27; Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and
Presidential Power: A Theory, 29 Presidential Stud. Q. 850, 855 (1999) [hereinafter Moe
& Howell, Unilateral Action].
249. Moe & Howell, Unilateral Action, supra note 248, at 855.
250. See Howell, supra note 244, at 101 (discussing informational advantages of
President); Moe & Howell, Unilateral Action, supra note 248, at 855 ("[P]residents ...
have at their disposal a tremendous reservoir of expertise, experience, and information,
both in the institutional presidency and in the bureaucracy at large."). For a helpful
account of mechanisms for congressional information gathering and oversight of agency
action, see Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2006).
251. See Howell, supra note 244, at 108 (arguing that when members of Congress
decide to challenge President on an issue they "must always weigh the attendant electoral
costs and benefits").
252. Lewis, supra note 3, at 4.
253. Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential
Advantage, in The Presidency and the Political System 443, 454 (Michael Nelson ed., 6th
ed. 2000) [hereinafter Moe, Presidency and Bureaucracy]; see also Moe & Howell,
Unilateral Action, supra note 248, at 861 (noting that congressional response to executive
orders will turn on orders' effect on legislative constituencies, not "Congress's power vis-;!vis the president").
254. See Moe, Presidency and Bureaucracy, supra note 253, at 454 (noting that
members of Congress have strong incentives to defend constituents' concerns and
maintain member autonomy).
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empirical work shows that of the thousands of executive orders issued,
2 5
Congress has overridden only a handful through legislation. 1
Kagan acknowledges that Congress cannot be relied upon to con25 6
strain the President's adventurous assertions of statutory authority.
She proposes judicial review and congressional self-help, in the form of
drafting more restrictive statutes, as avenues of response. 2 57 But the extent to which the courts can check the President's assertion of statutory
power depends in part upon the very substantive question at issue:
whether courts will read delegations to executive officials as granting
power to the President.2 58 If they do, then judicial review does not itself
provide a constraint on the President-at least as to the question of who
is the recipient of authority. Indeed, a judicial decision upholding a sitting President's assertion of power, even where that assertion is beyond
the enacting and current Congresses' preferences, still requires that Congress assemble a veto-proof supermajority to override the President's action. Judicial review thus provides a viable source of constraint only if it
proceeds from a set of interpretations and standards of review that are
themselves constraining.
While reading presidential authority into simple delegations to executive officials might provide Congress reason to draft more restrictive statutes in the future, that does not constrain the scope of the statutory
power that presidents may claim under existing statutes. 259 Moreover, if
it is true that Congress is institutionally less interested in policing the
scope of presidential prerogatives than the President is interested in expanding them, Kagan's view may be overly optimistic as to the constraints
that Congress will impose in future legislation.
More fundamentally, this broad reading of the President's statutory
powers does not come to terms with the scope of the incentive of the
President to reach beyond the boundaries of existing statutes. The position of the President in the American constitutional system of separation
of powers, as Bruce Ackerman argues, creates numerous structural
pathologies. 260 Because Congress and the President are elected independently, Congress may act to frustrate the President's legislative agenda.
The more Congress does so, Ackerman suggests, the more the President
"will be tempted to achieve his objectives by politicizing the administration of whatever-laws-happen-to-be-on-the-books. ' 26 That dynamic creates pressure for agency heads to find authority to meet the political plat255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
688-715
261.

See Howell, supra note 244, at 116.
See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2350.
Id. at 2350-52.
It also depends, of course, on how they review what powers are granted.
See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2352 (acknowledging this point).
See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633,
(2000).
Id. at 712.
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form of the President. At its worst, it can "create an environment in
26 2
which loyalty to the President trumps the rule of law."
As a protection against those risks, we are better off with a conception of the agency official's role that emphasizes the official's independent duty under the law, as opposed to its acting in the stead of the President. That emphasis on the independent legal duty and discretion
created by statutory delegations, if absorbed by executive branch actors,
has the potential to contribute to the protection against presidential
abuse of the administrative state. This conception of agencies' role, of
course, is at best a partial solution. It proceeds from within the current
structure of the administrative state, as opposed to envisioning wide-ranging institutional and constitutional reforms. 263 And like so much in
human affairs, it depends on the good judgment of those who exercise
authority. But standing from inside our system, we have reason to embrace a conception of the role of statutory delegates that places a duty
under the law at its center. That position seems wholly appropriate for a
nation committed, as Chief Justice Marshall intoned in the language of
his day, to "a government of laws, and not of men." 264 For us, that involves defending an administration of laws, not of the President.
CONCLUSION

The scope of the President's statutory powers fundamentally shapes
the range of actions that the President can take unilaterally-that is, without concurrent agreement from Congress. In modern government, important purposes are served by direct congressional authorization of presidential powers. But in view of the significance of the President's
assertions of statutory powers, it is a critical question exactly when a statute grants power to the President.
This Article aims to rule out one recurring broad construction of the
President's statutory powers-namely that delegations to executive officials should be read to include the President as an implied recipient of
statutory authority. It specifically argues that such implied extensions are
not the most natural construction of delegations to executive officials,
and suggests that there are grounds to conclude that such constructions
may not even be "fairly possible." Congress's enduring practice of enacting delegations to executive officials under express conditions of presidential approval supports a negative implication that delegations to executive officials alone do not grant the President directive powers.
Moreover, in view of the structural incentives for presidents to make adventurous claims of statutory authorization, and the institutional deficits
of Congress to check these assertions, there are strong reasons to em262. Id. at 713.
263. Cf. id. at 714 (proposing constitution for administrative state combining features
of Administrative Procedure Act and parliamentary system).
264. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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brace statutory constructions that limit the occasions for the President to
claim statutory power (and limit judicial deference to the President) to
statutes in which Congress has delegated such power expressly to the
President.
These statutory conclusions should, matter to proponents of a
strongly unitary conception of the executive. They reveal that their constitutional commitments require, at the very minimum, reliance on principles of constitutional avoidance to save the unitary position from requiring the wholesale unconstitutionality of delegations to officials other than
the President. And depending on where one draws the line between constructions that are not the most natural and those that are not "fairly
possible," these commitments may require such a constitutional upheaval. That consequence should give pause.
These statutory constructions also matter to administrative government as it exists today. They define a necessary condition for the President's statutory powers to administer the laws directly-a grant of authority to the President in name-and to bind administrative actors to his
views on the implementation of a statute. This construction reinforces a
conception of delegation of power as conferring an independent discretion on agency officials subject to the managerial oversight, but not directive authority, of the President. Further, based on these statutory conclusions, presidential oversight is an insufficient condition for Chevron
deference. Deference under Chevron itself requires a grant of authority,
so the President's own constructions of statutory authority may qualify for
Chevron deference only if they follow from an express delegation.
This focus on express delegation reinforces the accountability of
Congress for those powers that it seeks to grant the President directly,
and emphasizes that every executive officer delegated statutory power has
a duty under the law that exceeds his or her duty to the President. This
theory still allows for tremendous presidential influence over the administration of laws, but it provides a constraint. The structural and political
advantages of the President in our constitutional system make such constraint worth embracing.
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